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Abstract
We introduce a new solution concept for models of coalition formation, called the
myopic stable set (MSS). The MSS is defined for a general class of social environments
and allows for an infinite state space. An MSS exists and, under minor continuity
assumptions, it is also unique.
The MSS generalizes and unifies various results from more specific applications.
It coincides with the coalition structure core in coalition function form games when
this set is non-empty; with the set of stable matchings in the Gale-Shapley matching
model; with the set of Pareto optimal allocations in the Shapley-Scarf housing matching
model; with the set of pairwise stable networks and closed cycles in models of network
formation; with the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in pseudo-potential games
and finite supermodular games; and with the set of mixed strategy Nash equilibria in
several classes of two-player games.
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1 Introduction
Models of coalition formation study a widespread and important pattern of human interac-
tion: agents tend to form groups of equally interested individuals, but these groups behave
in a non-cooperative way towards outsiders. For example, individuals in a community join
forces to provide a local public good, voters create parties to attain their political goals, and
firms set up lobby groups to influence policy-makers.
The literature studies coalition formation in many distinct settings, like networks, coali-
tion function form games, and matching models. In this paper, we focus on a general class
of social environments that covers all of these settings and many more. More precisely, we
define a social environment on the basis of four components (Chwe, 1994): a finite collection
of agents, a set of social states, for every agent preferences over the set of states, and an
effectivity correspondence that models the feasible transitions from one state to another. We
only require that the set of social states is a non-empty, compact metric space. As such, in
contrast to most settings in the literature, we allow the state space to be infinite.
For such social environments, we define a new solution concept called the myopic stable
set, abbreviated as MSS. The MSS extends the idea of level-1 farsighted stability by Herings,
Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch (2009, 2014) from finite networks to the general class of social
environments. The MSS is defined by three conditions, deterrence of external deviations,
asymptotic external stability, and minimality. Deterrence of external deviations requires
that no coalition benefits by deviating from a state inside the MSS to a state outside the
MSS. Asymptotic external stability makes sure that from any state outside the MSS it is
possible to get arbitrarily close to a state inside by a sequence of coalitional deviations. The
final condition, minimality, requires that the MSS is minimal with respect to set inclusion.
Our notion of dominance is myopic as agents or coalitions do not predict how their
decision to change the current state will lead to further changes by other agents or coalitions.
Such a notion is natural in complex social environments where the number of possible states
is large and agents have little information about the possible actions other agents may take
or the incentives of other agents. The myopic stable set thereby distinguishes our approach
from the ones in the literature that focus on farsightedness (see among others, Chwe, 1994;
Xue, 1998; Herings, Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch, 2004, 2009, 2014; Dutta, Ghosal, and Ray,
2005; Page, Wooders, and Kamat, 2005; Page and Wooders, 2009; Ray and Vohra, 2015).
Our approach is more in line with myopic concepts like the core and the von Neumann-
Morgenstern stable set. As we will see in the application to normal-form games, it is also
intimately connected to the notion of Nash equilibrium.
Our first main result (Theorem 3.1) shows that every social environment contains at least
one non-empty MSS. Moreover, under minor continuity assumptions, we establish uniqueness
of the MSS (Theorem 3.6). The existence and uniqueness results differ from many other
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popular solution concepts in the literature. For instance, the core and the coalition structure
core for coalition function form games can be empty (Bondareva, 1963; Scarf, 1967; Shapley,
1967); the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set may fail to exist or to be unique (Lucas,
1968, 1992), and the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria may be empty.
We provide several additional results that provide more insights about the structure of
an MSS. For finite state spaces, we fully characterize the MSS as the union of all closed
cycles (Theorem 3.13), i.e., subsets which are closed under coalitional better replies. This
result also provides a connection to stochastic processes of coalition and network formation
as in Jackson and Watts (2002) and Sawa (2014) and suggests possibilities for refinements
in the spirit of Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993). For infinite spaces,
the union of all closed cycles is found to be a subset of the MSS. This result is helpful in
applications and in the comparison to other solution concepts. For instance, any state in the
core is a closed cycle and is therefore included in the MSS. As a special case of this result,
it follows that the MSS contains the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in a normal-form
game. Next we define a generalization of the weak improvement property (Friedman and
Mezzetti, 2001) to social environments and we show that, under weak continuity conditions,
the weak improvement property characterizes the collection of social environments for which
the MSS coincides with the core. We also show that if the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable
set exists, then it has a non-empty intersection with any MSS.
We demonstrate the versatility of our results by analyzing the relationship between the
MSS and other solution concepts in specific social environments. In particular, we show that
the MSS coincides with the coalition structure core for coalition function form games (Ko´czy
and Lauwers, 2004) whenever the coalition structure core is non-empty; with the set of stable
matchings in the one-to-one matching model by Gale and Shapley (1962); with the set of
Pareto efficient house allocations in the housing matching model of Shapley and Scarf (1974);
with the set of pairwise stable networks and closed cycles in models of network formation
(Jackson and Watts, 2002); and with the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in pseudo-
potential games (Dubey, Haimanko, and Zapechelnyuk, 2006) and finite supermodular games
(Topkis, 1979 and Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). For the mixed extension of the game, the
MSS coincides with the set of mixed strategy Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum games
and in two-player games in which one player has two actions.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides the primitives of our gen-
eral framework of social environments and introduces and motivates the MSS. Section 3
establishes existence, non-emptiness, and uniqueness results. Section 4 analyzes our solution
concept for various settings and relates it to other stability concepts from the literature.
Section 5 is a conclusion. All proofs can be found in the appendix.
3
2 The Myopic Stable Set
In this section, we first introduce the concept of a social environment. Next, we introduce
the notions of dominance and asymptotic dominance which are used to define our solution
concept, the myopic stable set.
Let N be a non-empty finite set of individuals. A coalition S is a subset of N . The set
of non-empty subsets of N is denoted by N . Let (X, d) be a metric space, where X denotes
our non-empty state space and d is a metric on X.1 Let some state x ∈ X be given and let
ε ∈ R++. We define
Bε(x) = {y ∈ X|d(x, y) < ε}
as the open ball around x with radius ε. The set Bε(x) contains all states in X that are in
an ε-neighborhood of x. For a sequence (xk)k∈N in X, we write xk → x if for all ε > 0, there
is a number N ∈ N such that for all k ≥ N , xk ∈ Bε(x), i.e. the sequence (xk)k∈N converges
to x.
An effectivity correspondence E associates with each pair of states (x, y) ∈ X × X a,
possibly empty, collection of coalitions E(x, y) ⊆ N . If S ∈ E(x, y), we say that coalition S
can move from state x to state y. If E(x, y) = ∅, then no coalition can move from x to y.
Each individual i ∈ N has a complete and transitive preference relation i over the state
space X. The profile (i)i∈N then lists the preferences of all individuals in N . We denote
the asymmetric part of i by i, i.e., x i y if and only if x i y and not y i x.
A social environment is now defined as follows.
Definition 2.1 (Social Environment). A social environment is a tuple
Γ = (N, (X, d), E, (i)i∈N)
consisting of a non-empty, finite set of agents N , a non-empty, compact metric space (X, d)
of states, an effectivity correspondence E on X, and a profile of preference relations (i)i∈N
over X.
In Section 4, we specify different social environments which correspond to applications
such as coalition function form games, one-to-one matching, housing matching, network
formation, and non-cooperative normal-form games.
For a given social environment Γ = (N, (X, d), E, (i)i∈N), we say that a state y ∈ X
dominates another state x ∈ X if there is a coalition such that (i) it can move from x to y
and (ii) each of its members strictly prefers y over x.
1A metric is a function d : X ×X → R+ such that (i) for every x, y ∈ X: d(x, y) = 0 if and only if x = y,
(ii) for every x, y ∈ X: d(x, y) = d(y, x), and (iii) for every x, y, z ∈ X, d(x, y) ≤ d(x, z) + d(z, y).
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Definition 2.2 (Dominance). A state y ∈ X dominates the state x ∈ X under E if there
exists a coalition S ∈ E(x, y) such that for every i ∈ S it holds that y i x.
An alternative notion is the one of weak dominance. A state y weakly dominates x if
there exists a coalition S ∈ E(x, y) such that for all i ∈ S, y i x and there is at least
one j ∈ S such that y j x. The notion of weak dominance only requires that no member
of S loses while at least one strictly gains. Definition 2.2 on the other hand requires that
everybody in the coalition S strictly gains. As it turns out, when we restrict ourselves to
settings with a finite state space X, all theoretical results from this section remain valid when
we replace dominance by weak dominance. For settings where X is infinite, most results
remain valid with the exception of Theorem 3.9 and Corollary 3.10 below which provide
sufficient conditions for uniqueness of the MSS. We will come back to this issue when we
present these two results.
Let some state x ∈ X be given. The subset of X consisting of all states that dominate x
together with the state x itself is denoted by f(x), so
f(x) = {x} ∪ {y ∈ X|y dominates x under E}.
We refer to f as the dominance correspondence. We define the two-fold composition of f by
f 2(x) = {z ∈ X|∃y ∈ X : y ∈ f(x) and z ∈ f(y)}.
By induction, we can define the k-fold iteration fk(x) as the subset of X that contains
all states obtained by a composition of dominance correspondences of length k ∈ N, i.e.,
y ∈ fk(x) if there is a z ∈ X such that y ∈ f(z) and z ∈ fk−1(x). Since by definition
x ∈ f(x), it holds that, for all k, ` ∈ N, if k ≤ `, then fk(x) ⊆ f `(x). We define the set of all
states that can be reached from x by a finite number of dominations by fN(x), so
fN(x) =
⋃
k∈Nf
k(x).
A state y is said to asymptotically dominate the state x if starting from x, it is possible to
get arbitrarily close to y in a finite number of dominations.
Definition 2.3 (Asymptotic Dominance). A state y ∈ X asymptotically dominates the state
x ∈ X under E if for all ε > 0 there exists k ∈ N and a state z ∈ fk(x) such that z ∈ Bε(y).
We denote by f∞(x) the set of all states in X that asymptotically dominate x. Formally,
we have
f∞(x) = {y ∈ X|∀ε > 0, ∃k ∈ N, ∃z ∈ fk(x) such that z ∈ Bε(y)}.
It is easy to see that the set f∞(x) coincides with the closure of the set fN(x).
We are now ready to define our solution concept, the myopic stable set, abbreviated as
MSS.
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Definition 2.4 (Myopic Stable Set). Let Γ = (N, (X, d), E, (i)i∈N) be a social environ-
ment. The set M ⊆ X is a myopic stable set if it is closed and satisfies the following three
conditions:
1. Deterrence of external deviations: For all x ∈M , f(x) ⊆M .
2. Asymptotic external stability: For all x /∈M, f∞(x) ∩M 6= ∅.
3. Minimality: There is no closed set M ′ (M that satisfies Conditions 1 and 2.
Let M be an MSS. Deterrence of external deviations requires that no coalition can prof-
itably deviate to a state outside M . Next, asymptotic external stability requires that any
state outside M is asymptotically dominated by a state in M . Hence, from any state outside
M it is possible to get arbitrary close to a state in M by a finite number of myopic deviations.
Observe that the empty set would necessarily violate asymptotic external stability, so any
MSS is non-empty.
Although the property of asymptotic external stability resembles a notion of farsighted-
ness, there is an important distinction. In models with farsighted behavior, coalitions deviate
from the current state because they expect to profit from a move in some future period, i.e.,
after possible subsequent moves by other coalitions. Our definition of asymptotic external
stability, however, is myopic in the sense that coalitions deviate only because they see an
immediate gain, without anticipating potential future deviations.
Finally, minimality imposes that there is no smaller closed set of states that satisfies
deterrence of external deviations and asymptotic external stability.
For finite state spaces, the restriction imposed by asymptotic external stability remains
unchanged if f∞ is replaced by fN. We refer to the property that for all states x /∈ M,
fN ∩M 6= ∅ as iterated external stability. For infinite state spaces, the two concepts differ.
In particular, if one uses iterated external stability instead of asymptotic external stability,
an MSS might fail to exist. This is illustrated in the following example.
Example 2.5. Consider the social environment Γ = ({1}, (X, d), E,1), where the state
space is given by X = {1/k|k ∈ N} ∪ {0} and d(x, y) = |x − y|. Note that X is compact.
Preferences 1 are defined by x 1 y if and only if x = y or x < y. The effectivity
correspondence E is such that {1} ∈ E(1/k, 1/(k + 1)) for every k ∈ N and E(x, y) = ∅
otherwise. It follows that
f( 1
k
) =
{
1
k
, 1
k+1
}
.
Observe that 0 ∈ f∞(x) for every x ∈ X and that f(0) = {0}. It now follows easily that {0}
is an MSS.
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Suppose we replace the requirement of asymptotic external stability by the stronger
requirement of iterated external stability. We show that there is no closed set satisfying
iterated external stability together with deterrence of external deviations and minimality.
Towards a contradiction, suppose that the closed set M ⊆ X satisfies these properties. Since,
for every k ∈ N, 0 /∈ fN (1/k), the set {0} does not satisfy iterated external stability. Given
that M 6= {0} and M is non-empty, there is k ∈ N such that 1/k ∈M . Let k be the smallest
such number. From deterrence of external deviations, we have that also 1/(k + 1) ∈ M .
Based on the corresponding properties of M , it is easy to verify that the closed, non-empty
set M ′ = M \{1/k} satisfies deterrence of external deviations and iterated external stability.
Since M ′ is a proper subset of M , M violates the minimality property.
An MSS is defined as a minimal set satisfying deterrence of external deviations and
asymptotic external stability. Dropping the minimality requirement, we can define the con-
cept of a quasi myopic stable set (QMSS) which is useful in the proofs.
Definition 2.6 (Quasi Myopic Stable Set). Let Γ = (N, (X, d), E, (i)i∈N) be a social
environment. The set M ⊆ X is a quasi myopic stable set if it is closed and satisfies
deterrence of external deviations and asymptotic external stability.
3 General Properties
This section establishes existence of the myopic stable set in general and, under weak addi-
tional assumptions, its uniqueness. We also derive some additional structural properties of
myopic stable sets that are used in the next section. We provide a brief discussion of the
relationship between the MSS and the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. Finally, we
relate our approach to dynamic models that rely on stochastic processes.
3.1 Existence and Uniqueness
The following main result shows existence of the myopic stable set.
Theorem 3.1 (Existence). Let Γ be a social environment. Then an MSS exists.
The proof of Theorem 3.1 starts from the observation that the set of all states is a QMSS.
The collection of all sets of states that are a QMSS is partially ordered by inclusion. We
verify that the partially ordered set satisfies the conditions for Zorn’s lemma and apply it to
conclude that there is a minimal QMSS, i.e., an MSS.
Having established existence of an MSS, we now turn to the cardinality of such sets. The
next theorem derives a property that is very useful in the proofs and applications to come.
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Theorem 3.2. Let Γ be a social environment and let M be an MSS of Γ. If x ∈ M and
y ∈ f∞(x), then y ∈M .
Theorem 3.2 states that if a state belongs to an MSS, then every state that asymptotically
dominates it belongs to the same MSS.
The following theorem shows that two myopic stable sets cannot be disjoint.
Theorem 3.3. Let Γ be a social environment and let M1 and M2 be two myopic stable sets
of Γ. Then M1 ∩M2 6= ∅.
The intuition behind the proof of Theorem 3.3 is as follows. If a state in M1 does
not belong to M2, then it is asymptotically dominated by a state in M2 since M2 satisfies
asymptotic external stability. By Theorem 3.2, the asymptotically dominating state belongs
to M1 as well, so we have found a state in the intersection of M1 and M2.
The following example shows that uniqueness of an MSS cannot be demonstrated without
any additional assumptions.
Example 3.4. Consider the social environment Γ = ({1}, (X, d), E,1), where
X = {0, 1
2
, 1} ∪ { 1
k
| k ∈ N \ {1, 2}} ∪ {1− 1
k
| k ∈ N \ {1, 2}}
and the metric is given by d(x, y) = |x− y|.
The effectivity correspondence is such that the individual can move from both states 0
and 1 to state 1/2 and, for every k ∈ N\{1, 2}, from state 1−1/k to state 1/k and from state
1/k to state 1− 1/(k+ 1). The individual cannot make any other moves. The preferences of
the individual are such that
2
3
≺1 13 ≺1 34 ≺1 14 ≺1 45 ≺1 15 ≺1 · · · ≺1 1 ≺1 0 ≺1 12 .
We claim that both {0, 1/2} and {1/2, 1} are myopic stable sets. Since the effectivity cor-
respondence admits no move outside the respective sets, both {0, 1/2} and {1/2, 1} satisfy
deterrence of external deviations. For asymptotic external stability, observe that for every
k ∈ N \ {1, 2} it holds that {0, 1} ⊂ f∞(1/k) and {0, 1} ⊂ f∞(1− 1/k). Moreover, we have
1/2 ∈ f(0) = f∞(0) and 1/2 ∈ f(1) = f∞(1). For minimality, the sets {0} and {1} violate
deterrence of external deviations since 1/2 ∈ f(0) and 1/2 ∈ f(1). The set {1/2} violates
asymptotic external stability as 1/2 /∈ f∞(x) for any x ∈ X different from 0, 1/2 and 1.
We can restore uniqueness by imposing the following mild continuity assumption on the
dominance correspondence f .
Definition 3.5 (Lower Hemi-continuity of f). The dominance correspondence f : X → X
is lower hemi-continuous if for every sequence (xk)k∈N in X such that xk → x and for every
y ∈ f(x) there is a sequence (yk)k∈N in X such that for all k, yk ∈ f(xk) and yk → y.
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This continuity assumption allows us to state the following uniqueness result.
Theorem 3.6. Let Γ be a social environment such that the corresponding dominance cor-
respondence f is lower hemi-continuous. Then Γ has a unique MSS.
The continuity condition of Theorem 3.6 is trivially satisfied when the state space X is
finite. As such, for all applications with a finite state space, we have uniqueness of the MSS.
The dominance correspondence f is defined in terms of the individual preference rela-
tions (i)i∈N and the effectivity correspondence E. To ease the verification of lower hemi-
continuity of f , we provide sufficient conditions on the primitives of a social environment.
As a first condition, we impose lower hemi-continuity of the effectivity correspondence
E. Towards this end, consider, for every S ∈ N , the correspondence GS : X → X defined
by
GS(x) = {x} ∪ {y ∈ X | S ∈ E(x, y)}, x ∈ X,
which associates to every state x ∈ X the union of {x} and the set of states coalition S can
move to from x.
Definition 3.7 (Lower Hemi-continuity of E). The effectivity correspondence E is lower
hemi-continuous if for every coalition S ∈ N the correspondence GS : X → X is lower hemi-
continuous, i.e., for every sequence (xk)k∈N in X such that xk → x and for every y ∈ GS(x)
there is a sequence (yk)k∈N such that yk ∈ GS(xk) and yk → y.
Our second condition is continuity of the preferences.
Definition 3.8 (Continuity of Preferences). The preference relation i of individual i ∈ N
is continuous if for any two sequences (xk)k∈N and (yk)k∈N in X with xk → x and yk → y
and, for every k ∈ N, xk i yk, it holds that x i y.
Theorem 3.9 shows that lower hemi-continuity of E and continuity of preferences is
sufficient for the dominance correspondence f to be lower hemi-continuous.
Theorem 3.9. Let Γ = (N, (X, d), E, (i)i∈N) be a social environment such that the effec-
tivity correspondence E is lower hemi-continuous and the preferences (i)i∈N are continuous.
Then the dominance correspondence f is lower hemi-continuous.
Combining Theorems 3.6 and 3.9 directly yields the following corollary which gives a
sufficient condition on the primitives of the model to obtain a unique MSS.
Corollary 3.10. Let Γ = (N, (X, d), E, (i)i∈N) be a social environment such that the effec-
tivity correspondence E is lower hemi-continuous and the preferences (i)i∈N are continuous.
Then Γ has a unique MSS.
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Recall the alternative notion of weak dominance, where a state y weakly dominates a
state x when there is a coalition S ∈ E(x, y) such that for all i ∈ S, y i x and there is
at least one j ∈ S such that y j x. When we replace dominance in the definition of the
MSS by weak dominance, all results in this section remain valid except for Theorem 3.9 and
Corollary 3.10. The following example presents a social environment in which the effectivity
correspondence is lower hemi-continuous and the preferences are continuous, but using weak
dominance in the definition of the MSS does not yield a unique MSS.
Example 3.11. Consider the social environment Γ = ({1, 2}, (X, d), E, (1,2)), where
X = {(0, 0), (1, 0), (2, 0)} ∪ {(0, 2
k
), (1, 1
k
), (2, 1
k
)|k ∈ N}
and d is the Euclidean metric on X, so d(x, y) = ‖x−y‖2. It clearly holds that X is compact.
Individual 1 only cares about the first component of the state while individual 2 only
cares about the second component. Both individuals prefer states where the component they
care about is lower over states where it is higher. Note that these preferences are continuous.
The effectivity correspondence is as follows. For every k ∈ N, the singleton {1} can move
from state (2, 1/k) to state (1, 1/k) and the singleton {2} can move from state (1, 1/k) to
state (2, 1/(k+1)). Moreover, for every k ∈ N, the singleton {2} can move from state (0, 2/k)
to state (1, 1/k). Coalition {1, 2} can move from states (1, 0) and (2, 0) to state (0, 0) and, for
every k ∈ N, from states (1, 1/k) and (2, 1/k) to state (0, 2/k). No other moves are possible.
To see that the effectivity correspondence is lower hemi-continuous, let the sequence
(xk)k∈N in X be such that xk → x. There are only three relevant sequences of states in X:
the sequence ((0, 2/k))k∈N, the sequence ((1, 1/k))k∈N , and the sequence ((2, 1/k))k∈N. The
first converges to (0, 0), the second to (1, 0), and the third to (2, 0).
Let some x ∈ {(0, 0), (1, 0), (2, 0)} be given. Since G{1}(x) = {x} and G{2}(x) = {x}, it
is immediate that G{1} and G{2} are lower hemi-continuous.
For G{1,2}, the only non-trivial cases are x = (1, 0) and x = (2, 0). We give the argument
for state x = (1, 0) explicitly. The argument for state (2, 0) follows by symmetry. For
every y ∈ G{1,2}(1, 0) we have to find a sequence (yk)k∈N such that yk ∈ G{1,2}(1, 1/k) and
yk → y. If y = (0, 0), we take the sequence ((0, 2/k))k∈N. If y = (1, 0), we take the sequence
((1, 1/k))k∈N.
Since f∞(0, 0) = {(0, 0)}, f∞(1, 0) = {(1, 0)}, and f∞(2, 0) = {(2, 0)}, it follows from
asymptotic external stability that {(0, 0), (1, 0), (2, 0)} is a subset of any MSS. Since this set
satisfies deterrence of external deviations and asymptotic external stability, it follows from
minimality that the unique MSS is equal to {(0, 0), (1, 0), (2, 0)}.
On the other hand, when we replace dominance in the definition of the MSS by weak
dominance, we obtain both the sets {(0, 0), (1, 0)} and {(0, 0), (2, 0)} as solutions. Indeed,
from both (1, 0) and (2, 0), the coalition {1, 2} can deviate to (0, 0) if only weak dominance
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is imposed. To satisfy asymptotic external stability, it is sufficient that on top of the state
(0, 0), either the state (1, 0) or the state (2, 0) should be present. By minimality, it follows
that only one of these states is included.
3.2 Closed Cycles and the Core
In this subsection, we give two general results about the structure of an MSS. The first result
relates the MSS to the union of all closed cycles. The second result characterizes the social
environments for which the MSS is equal to the core.
Definition 3.12 (Closed Cycle). A closed cycle of a social environment Γ is a set C ⊆ X
such that for every x ∈ C it holds that f∞(x) = C.
Thus, a closed cycle is a subset of X which is closed under the asymptotic dominance
correspondence f∞. We denote the union of all closed cycles by CC, so CC contains all
states that are part of some closed cycle. The following result characterizes the MSS for
social environments with a finite state space as the union of all closed cycles and shows that
this union is a subset of the MSS for social environments with an infinite state space.
Theorem 3.13. Let Γ = (N, (X, d), E, (i)i∈N) be a social environment and let M be an
MSS of Γ. It holds that CC ⊆M . If the state space X is finite, we have CC = M .
A sink is a closed cycle which consists of only one state, i.e., f(x) = {x}. The union of
all sinks is called the core.
Definition 3.14 (Core). Let Γ = (N, (X, d), E, (i)i∈N) be a social environment. The core
CO of Γ is given by
CO = {x ∈ X | f(x) = {x}}.
It is well-known that the core may be empty for some social environments. However, if it
is not empty, then it is always contained in the myopic stable set by virtue of Theorem 3.13
and the observation that a sink is a closed cycle which consists of one state.
Corollary 3.15. Let Γ be a social environment and let M be an MSS of Γ. Then we have
CO ⊆M .
The next definition is inspired by the finite analogue for normal-form games as presented
in Friedman and Mezzetti (2001).
Definition 3.16 (Weak (Finite) Improvement Property). A social environment Γ satisfies
the weak finite improvement property if for each state x ∈ X, fN(x) contains a sink and the
weak improvement property if for each state x ∈ X, f∞(x) contains a sink.
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The following theorem provides a characterization for the MSS in social environments
with the weak improvement property.
Theorem 3.17. Let Γ be a social environment with a lower hemi-continuous dominance
correspondence f. An MSS of Γ is equal to the core if and only if Γ satisfies the weak
improvement property.
It follows easily from the proof of Theorem 3.17 that the requirement of lower hemi-
continuity of f in Theorem 3.17 can be weakened to the requirement that CO is closed.
3.3 The von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Set
The von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) stable set provides a solution concept for an environ-
ment consisting of a set of states X and a dominance relation on this set X (von Neumann
and Morgenstern, 1944).
Definition 3.18 (vNM Stable Set). Let Γ = (N, (X, d), E, (i)i∈N) be a social environment.
The set V ⊆ X is a vNM stable set if it satisfies the following two conditions:
1. Internal stability: For all x, y ∈ V such that x 6= y it holds that y /∈ f(x).
2. External stability: For all x /∈ V, f(x) ∩ V 6= ∅.
Internal stability requires that no state in the set is dominated by another state in the
set. External stability requires that every state outside the set should be dominated by a
state in the set.
Our notion of asymptotic external stability has a similar flavor as the vNM notion of
external stability. However, the vNM stable set looks at one-step dominations while our
notion of asymptotic external stability uses asymptotic dominance, which can be seen as
an infinite iteration of one-step dominations. In fact, extending the definition of the vNM
stable set by allowing for a finite iteration of one-step dominations, i.e., replacing f by fN in
Definition 3.18, has also been advocated by several authors, see Harsanyi (1974), van Deemen
(1991), Page and Wooders (2009), and Herings, Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch (2017).
On the other hand, our notion of deterrence of external deviations is quite different from
the vNM notion of internal stability. While we allow that a state in the MSS is dominated
by another state in the MSS, this is prohibited in the vNM stable set. Moreover, unlike our
concept, in the vNM stable set it is allowed that a state in the set is dominated by a state
outside the set.
In terms of predictions, first note that an MSS always exists and is unique under weak
continuity assumptions, whereas the vNM stable set may not exist and if it exists may fail
to be unique. If the vNM stable set exists, there are a few connections between the MSS
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and the vNM stable set. First of all, both sets contain the core. Second, the intersection
between the vNM stable set and the MSS is non-empty as is stated in the next result.
Theorem 3.19. Let Γ = (N, (X, d), E, (i)i∈N) be a social environment for which a vNM
stable set V exists. If M is an MSS of Γ, then M ∩ V 6= ∅.
By Theorem 3.13, the MSS contains the union of all closed cycles. If the vNM stable set
exists, one can show that it contains at least one state from every closed cycle.
It is easily verified that Theorem 3.19 remains true if the dominance correspondences fN
or f∞ are used in Definition 3.18.
3.4 Dynamic Stochastic Processes
Stochastic approaches have been frequently used in non-cooperative settings like normal-
form games. Sawa (2014) presents a general framework which extends such a stochastic
analysis to cooperative settings. In each period, one of the coalitions that can make a move
is randomly selected and chooses one of its moves at random. The move is carried out with
probability 1 if all members of the coalition would be strictly better off. If no member is
worse off, but at least one agent is indifferent, the move is carried out with a probability
strictly between 0 and 1. Otherwise, the move is not carried out. The resulting dynamic
process can be thought of as a better-response dynamic. To establish a connection to the
MSS, we consider a variation of the process in Sawa (2014) in which a coalition only moves
with positive probability if all coalition members are strictly better off.
Consider a social environment Γ = (N, (X, d), E, (i)i∈N) such that X is finite. For
states x, y ∈ X, let Q(x, y) denote the transition probability from state x to state y and let
Q be the matrix of transition probabilities. We say that Q is consistent with f if for every
y ∈ f(x) \ {x} it holds that Q(x, y) > 0 and for every y /∈ f(x) it holds that Q(x, y) = 0. In
particular, the state x need not change even if the set f(x)\{x} is non-empty. An interesting
special case is the one of uniform transition probabilities, which is obtained by setting, for
every x ∈ X and y ∈ f(x), Q(x, y) = 1/|f(x)|, where |f(x)| denotes the cardinality of the
set f(x).
The next result presents an equivalence between the MSS and the set of recurrent states
of the Markov chain (X,Q).
Theorem 3.20. Let Γ = (N, (X, d), E, (i)i∈N) be a social environment with finite state
space X, let f be the corresponding dominance correspondence, and let (X,Q) be a Markov
chain such that Q is consistent with f . Then the MSS of Γ is equal to the set of recurrent
states of (X,Q).
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For social environments with a finite number of states, Theorem 3.20 gives an equivalence
between the set of recurrent states of a dynamic process that selects all better responses
with positive probability and the MSS. This suggests the possibility of refinements based
on notions of stochastic stability that have been used in non-cooperative game theory by
Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) and Young (1993), in network formation by Jackson and
Watts (2002), and in more general coalitional settings by Sawa (2014).
The above results do not readily extend to settings where X is infinite. The next example
illustrates some of the complications that arise with an infinite state space.
Example 3.21. Consider the social environment Γ = (N, (X, d), E, (i)i∈N), where N =
{1, 2}, X = [0, 1] × [0, 1], and the metric is d(x, y) = ‖x − y‖1 = |x1 − y1| + |x2 − y2|. The
effectivity correspondence is such that individual 1 can change the first component of the
state and individual 2 the second component, so {1} ∈ E(x, y) if and only if x2 = y2 and
{2} ∈ E(x, y) if and only if x1 = y1. The coalition {1, 2} is never effective. The preferences
of the individuals are such that
x 1 y if and only if 2x1x2 − x1 − x2 ≥ 2y1y2 − y1 − y2,
x 2 y if and only if 2x1x2 − x1 − x2 ≤ 2y1y2 − y1 − y2.
It is not hard to see that this social environment corresponds to the normal-form game of
matching pennies, where x1 is the probability of the row player choosing “up” and x2 is the
probability of the column player choosing “left”. The unique Nash equilibrium of this game
is equal to x∗ = (1/2, 1/2).
For every x ∈ X, we define
f1(x) =

{y ∈ X | y1 ≤ x1 and y2 = x2} if x2 < 12 ,
{x} if x2 = 12 ,
{y ∈ X | y1 ≥ x1 and y2 = x2} if x2 > 12 ,
f2(x) =

{y ∈ X | y1 = x1 and y2 ≥ x2} if x1 < 12 ,
{x} if x1 = 12 ,
{y ∈ X | y1 = x1 and y2 ≤ x2} if x1 > 12 ,
so we can express the dominance correspondence as
f(x) = f1(x) ∪ f2(x).
We consider the better-response dynamics where each element of f(x) is selected with
equal probability. To do so, we define ρ1 : X → [0, 1] and ρ2 : X → [0, 1] as the functions
that project x on its first and second coordinate, respectively. We use λ to denote the
Lebesgue measure. Let B(X) denote the Borel σ-algebra on X. The transition probability
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kernel resulting from better-response dynamics is obtained by defining, for every x ∈ X, and
for every A ∈ B(X),
Q(x,A) =

0 if x = (1
2
, 1
2
) /∈ A,
1 if x = (1
2
, 1
2
) ∈ A,
2λ(ρ1(A ∩ f1(x))), if x1 = 12 , x2 6= 12 ,
2λ(ρ2(A ∩ f2(x))), if x1 6= 12 , x2 = 12 ,
λ(ρ1(A∩f1(x)))+λ(ρ2(A∩f2(x)))
λ(ρ1(f1(x)))+λ(ρ2(f2(x)))
, if x1 6= 12 , x2 6= 12 .
The first and second equality above show that the better-response dynamics never leaves the
Nash equilibrium once reached. The third equality concerns the case where only player 1
likes to move. Observe that if x1 = 1/2 and x2 6= 1/2, then λ(ρ1(f1(x))) = 1/2, which
explains the multiplication by 2. A similar remark applies to the fourth equality above.
For the last equality, notice that x1 6= 1/2 and x2 6= 1/2 implies that λ(ρ1(f1(x))) > 0 or
λ(ρ2(f2(x))) > 0, so there is no division by zero.
-
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Figure 1: Better-response dynamics for the game of matching pennies.
The Markov process is illustrated in Figure 1. The arrows indicate the direction in which
a state changes. A typical state can change in two directions, either west or east and either
north or south, thereby generating two line segments on which the next state lies.
For every A ∈ B(X), Q(·, A) is a measurable function on X, but it is in general not
continuous. For instance, if A = {x∗}, then Q(x,A) = 1 if x = x∗ and Q(x,A) = 0,
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otherwise. Indeed, the state x∗ does not belong to f(x) unless x = x∗ and in that case
f(x∗) = {x∗}.
In this setting and other settings with an infinite state space, the Markov chain returns
to a given state with probability zero, so the concept of a recurrent state is of less use and
importance. Instead, for infinite settings, the property of irreducibility is often studied, which
expresses that all parts of the state space can be reached by the Markov chain, no matter
what the starting point is. Given a state x ∈ X and a set A in the Borel σ-algebra B(X) on
X, let L(x,A) denote the probability that the Markov chain has a realization belonging to A
at some point in the future when starting from x. Let ϕ be the measure on X that assigns
to each set in B(X) its Lebesgue measure. A Markov process (X,Q) is called ϕ-irreducible
if for every A ∈ B(X) such that ϕ(A) > 0 it holds that L(x,A) > 0 for every x ∈ X.
The Markov process (X,Q) in Example 3.21 is such that X can be decomposed in two
parts, namely {x∗} and X \ {x∗}. There is no transition between these two sets of states
and the restriction of the Markov process to each set is irreducible. This is obvious for {x∗}.
The next result shows this for X \ {x∗}.
Theorem 3.22. The restriction of the Markov process (X,Q) in Example 3.21 to X \ {x∗}
is ϕ-irreducible.
Example 3.21 shows that for the social environment corresponding to the normal-form
game of matching pennies, none of the strategy profiles is singled out by the stochastic
better-response dynamics. In contrast, we will show in Subsection 4.4 that the unique MSS
consists of the Nash equilibrium x∗.
4 Applications
In this section, we illustrate the generality of our setting and the useful common structure
of our results by means of four specific models that have been studied extensively in the
literature: coalition function form games, one-to-one matching models, models of network
formation, and normal-form games. For each of these settings, we first specify the social
environment, i.e., the set of individuals N , the state space (X, d), the effectivity correspon-
dence E, and the preferences (i)i∈N . Subsequently, we discuss how the results from the
previous section can be applied.
4.1 Coalition Function Form Games
A coalition function form game is defined by a tuple (N, v), where N is the set of players
and v : 2N → R is a characteristic function that assigns to each coalition S ⊆ N a number
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v(S) ∈ R, called the coalitional value of S, with the usual convention that v(∅) = 0. A
coalition structure is a partition pi of N . It describes how the grand coalition is divided
into various sub-coalitions. The collection of all coalition structures, i.e., the collection of
partitions of N , is denoted by Π.
For coalition function form games, we define X as the set of coalition structures Π
together with all individually rational payoff vectors that can be obtained by allocating the
coalitional values among the members of the respective coalitions:
X =
{
(pi, u) ∈ Π× RN
∣∣∣∣∣∀i ∈ N : ui ≥ v({i}) and ∀S ∈ pi : ∑
i∈S
ui = v(S)
}
.
Given a state x ∈ X, we denote by pi(x) the projection to its first component, i.e., the
coalition structure, and by u(x) the projection to its second component, i.e., the payoff
vector, so we can write x = (pi(x), u(x)). The restriction of the payoff vector u(x) to the
members in coalition S is denoted by uS(x). The set X is non-empty since it always contains
the state where N is partitioned into singletons and each player i ∈ N receives the payoff
v({i}).
We define the metric d on X by setting for all x, y ∈ X,
d(x, y) = 1{pi(x)6=pi(y)} + ‖u(x)− u(y)‖∞,
where 1 is the indicator function and ‖.‖∞ is the infinity norm. It is easily seen that (X, d)
is compact.
We define preferences i over the state space X by setting x i y if and only if ui(x) ≥
ui(y), i.e., individual i’s payoff in state x is at least as high as in state y.
For each ordered pair of states x, y, the effectivity correspondence E(x, y) specifies which
coalitions can change state x into state y. As an example that imposes some reasonable
structure on the effectivity correspondence, we provide a brief outline of the notion of coali-
tional sovereignty (Konishi and Ray, 2003; Ko´czy and Lauwers, 2004; Ray and Vohra, 2014,
2015; Herings, Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch, 2017).
When a coalition of players S—called the leaving players—decides to leave their old
coalitions to create a new group, the state changes to a new state y characterized by a new
coalition structure pi(y) and a new payoff vector u(y). The collection of coalitions of pi(x)
that are unaffected by this change is denoted by U(x, S) and the set of all players in this
group by U(x, S). Formally, we have
U(x, S) = {T ∈ pi(x)|S ∩ T = ∅},
U(x, S) = ∪T∈U(x,S)T.
This notation helps us in defining coalitional sovereignty.
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Definition 4.1 (Coalitional sovereignty). An effectivity correspondence E satisfies coali-
tional sovereignty if the following two conditions hold:
(1) Non-interference: For every x, y ∈ X, if S ∈ E(x, y) and T ∈ U(x, S), then S ∈ pi(y),
T ∈ pi(y), and uT (x) = uT (y).
(2) Full support: For every x ∈ X, for every S ∈ N , and for every u ∈ RS such that for all
i ∈ S : ui ≥ v({i}) and
∑
i∈S ui = v(S), there is a state y ∈ X such that S ∈ E(x, y)
and uS(y) = u.
Intuitively, non-interference requires that if a coalition S induces a change from a state
x to a state y, then the unaffected coalitions in U(x, S) are still part of the new coalition
structure pi(y) and every unaffected player i ∈ U(x, S) keeps his old payoff, i.e., ui(x) = ui(y).
Full support requires that every coalition S has the opportunity to move to a new state where
it has the freedom to redistribute its worth v(S) at will.
Coalitional sovereignty does not fully specify the effectivity correspondence E. In partic-
ular, it leaves unspecified the payoffs and coalition structure of players that are neither part
of the leaving coalition S nor part of the unaffected players U(x, S), i.e., players in the set
N \ (S ∪ U(x, S)). We call these players residual players. Indeed, one of the more contro-
versial issues is to what extent the leaving players have the power to influence the coalition
structure and payoffs of these residual players; see Shubik (1962), Hart and Kurz (1983),
Konishi and Ray (2003), and Ray and Vohra (2014) for related discussions and alternative
viewpoints. One frequently used specification is the γ-model (Hart and Kurz, 1983). The
γ-model prescribes that the residual players are divided into singletons. This assumption is
justified by the viewpoint that a coalition is only maintained if there is unanimous agree-
ment among its members. As such, the departure of one individual implies the collapse of
the entire coalition. In our setting, the γ-model imposes the following restriction on the
effectivity correspondence.
Definition 4.2 (γ-model). The effectivity correspondence E is induced by the γ-model if it
satisfies coalitional sovereignty and
(3) For every x, y ∈ X, for every S ∈ E(x, y), if i ∈ N \ (S ∪ U(x, S)), then {i} ∈ pi(y).
The γ-model associates a unique social environment to each coalition function form game.
We know, by Theorem 3.1, that there exists at least one non-empty MSS. Let us first show
that for coalition function form games, the MSS is also unique. Towards this end, we first
show that the effectivity correspondence E is lower hemi-continuous and that the preference
relations i are continuous.
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Theorem 4.3. Let (N, v) be a coalition function form game and Γ = (N, (X, d), E, (i)i∈N)
be the social environment induced by the γ-model. Then the effectivity correspondence E
is lower hemi-continuous and the preferences (i)i∈N are continuous.
Theorem 4.3 together with Corollary 3.10 shows uniqueness of the MSS.
Corollary 4.4. Let (N, v) be a coalition function form game and Γ be the social environment
induced by the γ-model. Then Γ has a unique MSS.
In fact, most alternatives of the γ-model will also lead to lower hemi-continuity of E, so
will also have a unique MSS. However, establishing the lower hemi-continuity of E must be
done case by case.
One of the most prominent set-valued solution concepts for coalition function form games
is the coalition structure core.
Definition 4.5 (Coalition Structure Core). Let (N, v) be a coalition function form game
and Γ be the social environment induced by the γ-model. The coalition structure core of
(N, v) is the set of states x ∈ X such that for every coalition S ∈ N∑
i∈S
ui(x) ≥ v(S).
In words, the coalition structure core gives to the members of each coalition at least the
payoff they can obtain by forming that coalition.
Theorem 4.6. Let (N, v) be a coalition function form game and Γ = (N, (X, d), E, (i)i∈N)
be the social environment induced by the γ-model. The coalition structure core of (N, v) is
equal to the core of Γ.
Ko´czy and Lauwers (2004) define the coalition structure core to be accessible if from any
initial state there is a finite sequence of states ending with an element of the coalition struc-
ture core and each element in that sequence outsider independently dominates the previous
element. Accessibility of the coalition structure core thus corresponds to iterated external
stability of the coalition structure core with respect to outsider independent domination. The
notion of outsider independent domination differs from our notion of a myopic improvement
in the γ-model in two ways. First, residual players are not required to become singletons
after a move has taken place. Second, improvements for the members of the coalition that
moves are not necessarily strict improvements. The following example illustrates that un-
der the requirement of strict improvements of all members involved in a move, as in our
dominance correspondence f , the coalition structure core does not satisfy iterated external
stability, i.e., it is not the case that for all states x ∈ X, there is a state y in the coalitional
structure core such that y ∈ fN(x).
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Example 4.7. Let (N, v) be a coalition function form game such that N = {1, 2, 3},
v({1, 2}) = 1, and v({2, 3}) = 1. All other coalitions have a coalitional value of 0. Thus,
player 2 can choose to form a coalition with either player 1 or player 3 to form a two-person
coalition generating a surplus equal to one. The coalition structure core therefore consists
of only two states, y and y′, with equal payoffs, u(y) = u(y′) = (0, 1, 0), and coalitional
structures pi(y) = {{1, 2}, {3}} and pi(y′) = {{1}, {2, 3}}.
Consider an initial state x0 ∈ X such that pi(x0) = {{1}, {2}, {3}} and u(x0) = (0, 0, 0).
Under our notion of a myopic improvement, where all players involved in a move have to
gain strictly, a state x1 6= x0 belongs to f(x0) if and only if either pi(x1) = {{1, 2}, {3}} and
u(x1) = (ε, 1 − ε, 0) for some ε ∈ (0, 1) or pi(x1) = {{1}, {2, 3}} and u(x1) = (0, 1 − ε, ε)
for some ε ∈ (0, 1). It follows that x1 is a state where either player 1 or player 3 receives a
payoff of zero and the other two players receive a strictly positive payoff summing up to 1.
Now consider any state xk such that either player 1 or player 3 receives 0 and the other
two players receive a strictly positive payoff summing up to 1. We claim that any state
xk+1 ∈ f(xk) has the same properties. Without loss of generality, assume that u3(xk) = 0.
Let xk+1 be an element of f(xk) different from xk. Since u1(x
k) + u2(x
k) = 1, the moving
coalition is {2, 3} and it holds that pi(xk+1) = {{1}, {2, 3}}. Moreover, it must also hold that
u2(x
k+1) > u2(x
k) > 0 and u3(x
k+1) > u3(x
k) = 0, which proves the claim. Thus, for every
k ∈ N, if xk ∈ fk(x0)\{x0}, then xk is such that there are two players with a strictly positive
payoff. It follows that there is no k ∈ N such that xk belongs to the coalition structure core.
The definition of an MSS uses asymptotic external stability rather than iterated exter-
nal stability. Theorem 4.8 shows that the MSS coincides with the coalition structure core
whenever the coalition structure core is non-empty.
Theorem 4.8. Let (N, v) be a coalition function form game, Γ the social environment
induced by the γ-model, and Y the coalition structure core of (N, v). If Y is non-empty,
then the unique MSS of Γ is equal to Y .
4.2 Matching
As a second application, we study a number of matching models. In particular, we consider
the one-to-one matching model of Gale and Shapley (1962), a different one-to-one matching
model of Knuth (1976), and the housing matching model of Shapley and Scarf (1974).
Gale and Shapley (1962) introduced a one-to-one matching model for a finite set N of
individuals, partitioned in the two exhaustive subgroups, men M and women W . The model
can be described by a tuple (M,W, (Pm)m∈M , (Pw)w∈W ) of individuals and their preference
relations. A matching is a function µ : M ∪W →M ∪W satisfying the following properties:
1. For every man m ∈M , µ(m) ∈ W ∪ {m}.
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2. For every women w ∈ W , µ(w) ∈M ∪ {w}.
3. For all men m ∈M and women w ∈ W , µ(m) = w if and only if µ(w) = m.
In this setting, our state space X consists of all possible matchings µ. Since X is finite, we
can endow it with the discrete metric
d(µ, µ′) = 1{µ 6=µ′}.
Each man m ∈ M has a complete and transitive strict preference relation Pm over the set
W ∪ {m} and each woman w ∈ W has a complete and transitive strict preference relation
Pw over the set M ∪ {w}. The preferences of the individuals (i)i∈M∪W over the set X are
induced by their preferences over their match, i.e., for all m ∈M it holds that µ m µ′ if and
only if µ(m)Pmµ
′(m) and for all w ∈ W it holds that µ w µ′ if and only if µ(w)Pwµ′(w).
The formulation of the effectivity correspondence allows us to study the consequences of
different hypothesis on the matching process. We introduce two common assumptions from
the literature on matching. First, every man or woman is allowed to break the link with the
current partner, in which case this man or woman and the former partner become single.
(1) For all i ∈ N and µ ∈ X with µ(i) 6= i, we have {i} ∈ E(µ, µ′) where µ′ ∈ X is such
that
(i) µ′(i) = i,
(ii) µ′(µ(i)) = µ(i),
(iii) for every j ∈ N \ {i, µ(i)}, µ′(j) = µ(j).
The second assumption is that any man and woman that are currently not matched to each
other can deviate by creating a link and thereby leaving their former partners single.
(2) For all m′ ∈M , w′ ∈ W , and µ ∈ X with µ(m′) 6= w′, we have that {m′, w′} ∈ E(µ, µ′),
where µ′ ∈ X is such that
(i) µ′(m′) = w′,
(ii) µ(m′) ∈ W implies µ′(µ(m′)) = µ(m′),
(iii) µ(w′) ∈M implies µ′(µ(w′)) = µ(w′),
(iv) for every j ∈ N \ {m′, w′, µ(m′), µ(w′)}, µ′(j) = µ(j).
Observe that these two conditions are in line with the γ-model of coalitional sovereignty.
This completes the description of the effectivity correspondence and thereby of the social
environment of the model by Gale and Shapley (1962).
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A matching µ is said to be stable in the matching problem (M,W, (Pm)m∈M , (Pw)w∈W )
if for every i ∈ M ∪W it does not hold that iPiµ(i) and if for every pair (m,w) ∈ M ×W
it does not hold that wPmµ(m) and mPwµ(w). It can easily be shown that a matching is
stable if and only if it is in the core of the social environment Γ.
In a seminal contribution to the literature, Gale and Shapley (1962) showed the existence
of a stable matching. The following result of Roth and Vande Vate (1990) will be helpful in
determining the relation between the set of stable matchings and the MSS.
Theorem 4.9. (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990) For every matching µ ∈ X there is a stable
matching µ′ such that µ′ ∈ fN(µ).
Since the set of states is finite in this application, it holds that fN(µ) = f∞(µ). Recalling
Definition 3.16, the result of Roth and Vande Vate (1990) means that Γ satisfies the weak
improvement property. For finite settings, f is always lower hemi-continuous. Thus, by
Theorem 3.17, the MSS of the social environment induced by the one-to-one matching model
coincides with the set of stable matchings, which is the statement of the following corollary.
Corollary 4.10. Let (M,W, (Pm)m∈M , (Pw)w∈W ) be a matching problem and let Γ be the
induced social environment. The unique MSS of Γ is equal to the set of stable matchings.
An alternative one-to-one matching model is due to Knuth (1976). This model differs
from the model of Gale and Shapley (1962) in that no individual is allowed to be single.
Therefore, it requires the number of men to be equal to the number of women. If a blocking
pair forms, the deserted partners are matched together. The primitives of the matching
model are given by a tuple (M,W, (Pm)m∈M , (Pw)w∈W ) with |M | = |W |. A matching is a
function µ : M ∪W →M ∪W satisfying the following properties:
1. For every man m ∈M , µ(m) ∈ W .
2. For every women w ∈ W , µ(w) ∈M .
3. For all men m ∈M and women w ∈ W , µ(m) = w if and only if µ(w) = m.
The state space X consists of all matchings µ satisfying the above three properties and
is endowed with the discrete metric d(µ, µ′) = 1{µ6=µ′}. The preferences of the individuals
(i)i∈M∪W over the set X are induced by their preferences over their match, i.e., for all
m ∈ M it holds that µ m µ′ if and only if µ(m)Pmµ′(m) and for all w ∈ W it holds that
µ w µ′ if and only if µ(w)Pwµ′(w). If a man and woman create a new link, the effectivity
correspondence also requires a link between their deserted partners. Formally,
1. For all m′ ∈M , w′ ∈ W , and µ ∈ X with µ(m′) 6= w′, we have that {m′, w′} ∈ E(µ, µ′),
where µ′ ∈ X is such that
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(i) µ′(m′) = w′,
(ii) µ′(µ(w′)) = µ(m′),
(iii) for every j ∈ N \ {m′, w′, µ(m′), µ(w′)}, µ′(j) = µ(j).
This completes the definition of the effectivity correspondence and thereby of the social
environment.
For this social environment, the core is non-empty. Moreover, as demonstrated by Tamura
(1993), when there are at least four women, there are preferences and a matching µ ∈ X such
that fN(µ) = f∞(µ) does not contain a stable matching. In these cases, the MSS contains
matchings outside the core and can thus be rather large.
To obtain an intuition which states outside the core are part of an MSS, recall that,
by Theorem 3.13, the MSS coincides with the union of all closed cycles. Thus, if the MSS
contains states outside the core, these states are part of a closed cycle with more than one
element. In such a cycle, agents myopically form new matches and eventually come back to
the initial match. These additional states are included in the MSS due to two restrictions
on the agents. First, agents are myopic and thus only consider deviations which result in an
immediate gain. Second, agents are additionally restricted by the effectivity correspondence
which only allows for pairwise deviations.
Another prominent matching model is the housing matching model of Shapley and Scarf
(1974). This model can be represented by a tuple (N,H, (Pi)i∈N), where N is a finite set of
individuals, H is a finite set of houses with the same cardinality as the set of individuals,
and each individual i ∈ N has a strict preference relation Pi over H. The aim is to allocate
the set of houses such that each house is owned by exactly one individual and no coalition
can benefit by exchanging houses among themselves. An allocation is represented by a
permutation matrix A with rows indexed by elements of N and columns indexed by elements
of H. All entries of A are 0 or 1 and both rows and columns of A sum up to 1. If for some
h ∈ H, for some i ∈ N , entry Aih = 1, then house h has been assigned to individual i. Row
i ∈ N of the matrix A is denoted by Ai.
In this setting, it is convenient to define the state space X as the set of all permutation
matrices A. Since X is finite, we can endow it with the discrete metric
d(A,A′) = 1{A 6=A′}.
The preferences of the individuals (i)i∈N over the set X are induced by their preferences
over houses. Let some individual i ∈ N be given as well as A,A′ ∈ X. Let h, h′ ∈ H be such
that Aih = A
′
ih′ = 1. Notice that h and h
′ are uniquely determined. It holds that A i A′ if
and only if hPih
′.
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A coalition S ∈ N can redistribute its houses within the coalition, but it cannot interfere
with the allocation of houses outside the coalition. More formally, the effectivity correspon-
dence satisfies the following condition: For every S ∈ N , for every A,A′ ∈ X, it holds that
S ∈ E(A,A′) if and only if for every i ∈ N \ S, Ai = A′i. This completes the description of
the social environment.
We define the subset Y of X as the Pareto efficient house allocations, so
Y = {A∗ ∈ X | ∀A ∈ X \ {A∗}, ∃i ∈ N such that A∗ i A}.
Theorem 4.11. Let (N,H, (Pi)i∈N) be a housing matching problem and let Γ be the induced
social environment. The unique MSS of Γ is equal to the set of Pareto efficient house
allocations.
The proof of Theorem 4.11 consists of two steps. The first step is to show that the core
of the social environment Γ is equal to the set of Pareto efficient house allocations. The
second step consists of applying the top trading cycle algorithm of Shapley and Scarf (1974)
to show that, starting from any initial allocation, it is possible to reach an allocation in the
core of Γ in a finite number of steps. By Theorem 3.17, the MSS is then equal to the set of
Pareto efficient house allocations.
4.3 Network Formation
As a third application, we look at the model of network formation by Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996). A network is given by a tuple g = (N, E), where the nodes N are the players of
the network and E is the set of undirected edges of the network. An undirected edge is
represented as a set of two distinct players. Two players i, j ∈ N are linked in g if and only
if {i, j} ∈ E . We abuse notation and write ij ∈ g if i and j are linked in the network g.
The set of all networks with node set N is denoted by G. A value function for player i is a
function vi : G → R that associates payoffs for player i for each network in G. A network
problem is thus given by (N,G, (vi)i∈N).
We identify X with the set G of all possible networks on N and endow it with the discrete
metric
d(g, g′) = 1{g 6=g′}.
Every player i ∈ N has a preference relation i over the set X of all possible networks
defined by g i g′ if and only if vi(g) ≥ vi(g′). Let g + ij be the network obtained from
network g by adding the link ij to g and let g − ij be the network obtained by deleting the
link ij from g.
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We follow Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) by considering deviations by coalitions of size
one or two and by assuming link-deletion to be one-sided and link addition to be two-sided.
One-sided link deletion allows every player to delete one of his links.
(1) For all players i ∈ N , all networks g ∈ X, and all links ij ∈ g, {i} ∈ E(g, g − ij).
Two-sided link addition allows any two players that are currently not linked to change the
network by forming a link between themselves.
(2) For all players i, j ∈ N , all networks g ∈ X with ij /∈ g, we have {i, j} ∈ E(g, g + ij).
This completes the description of our social environment for the network formation model. It
is straightforward to adjust the effectivity correspondence to incorporate models of network
formation where more than one link at a time can be changed by coalitions of arbitrary
size (Dutta and Mutuswami, 1997; Jackson and van den Nouweland, 2005) or where link
formation is one-sided (Bala and Goyal, 2000) into our framework. We refer to Page and
Wooders (2009) for a more extensive discussion of alternative rules of network formation.
A network g is said to be pairwise stable (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) if for every ij ∈ g
it holds that vi(g − ij) ≤ vi(g) and vj(g − ij) ≤ vj(g) and for every ij /∈ g it holds that
vi(g+ij) > vi(g) implies vj(g+ij) ≤ vj(g).2 It is not hard to show that a network is pairwise
stable if and only if it is in the core of the social environment Γ as defined in Definition 3.14.
Corollary 3.15 shows that any pairwise stable network is in the myopic stable set. How-
ever, it is not necessarily the case that the MSS only contains the pairwise stable networks.
Consider the binary relation R on X defined by gRg′ if g ∈ fN(g′), i.e., g can be reached
from g′ by a finite number of dominations. Let I be the symmetric part of R, i.e., gIg′ if
and only if gRg′ and g′Rg. Consider the set of equivalence classes E induced by I. Let us
denote the equivalence class of network g by [g], i.e., g′ ∈ [g] if and only if g′Ig. For two
distinct equivalence classes [g] and [g′] write [g]P [g′] if gRg′. It is easy to see that [g]P [g′] if
and only if gRg′ and not gRg′.
Let V be the collection of maximal elements of (E, P ), i.e., [g] ∈ V if there is no [g′] ∈ E
such that [g′]P [g]. Since an element of V simply represents a closed cycle as defined in
Definition 3.12, the following result follows from Theorem 3.13.
Corollary 4.12. Let (N,G, (vi)i∈N) be a network problem and let Γ be the induced social
environment. A network g belongs to the unique MSS M if and only if the equivalence class
[g] belongs to V , i.e., M = {g ∈ X|[g] ∈ V }.
2Pairwise stability as defined in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) is somewhat stronger and also requires that
there is no ij /∈ g such that vi(g+ij) > vi(g) and vj(g+ij) = vj(g). The weaker notion used here is discussed
as an alternative in Section 5 of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and is also widely used in the literature. For
generic network problems, there are no indifferences, so the two definitions are equivalent.
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Herings, Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch (2009) define the pairwise myopically stable sets
for network problems using the weaker notion of dominance corresponding to pairwise sta-
bility as defined in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). It is not hard to see that the MSS for
social environments Γ coincides with the pairwise myopically stable set for generic network
problems. For such network problems, Corollary 4.12 is therefore equivalent to Theorem 1
of Herings, Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch (2009) that characterizes the pairwise myopically
stable set as the union of closed cycles. In their paper, a closed cycle is defined in the sense of
Jackson and Watts (2002) for network problems. The notion of closed cycle of Definition 3.12
is the appropriate generalization to social environments.
4.4 Normal-Form Games
As a final application, we consider normal-form games. We split our analysis into pure and
mixed environments. They differ in whether players are allowed to use mixed strategies in
the underlying game.
Pure Environments A normal-form game G = (N, ((Σi, di), ui)i∈N) consists of a set of
players, N , and for each player a non-empty and compact metric space (Σi, di) of pure
strategies and a utility function ui : Σ→ R over the set of strategy profiles Σ =
∏
i∈N Σi. A
typical element of Σ is denoted by s.
For the corresponding social environment Γ = (N, (X, d), E, (i)i∈N), we equate the state
space X with the set of strategy profiles Σ and endow it with the product metric
d(s, s′) =
∑
i∈N
di(si, s
′
i).
The preferences (i)i∈N are such that s i s′ if and only if ui(s) ≥ ui(s′).
We write (sS, s−S) for the strategy profile where sS is the list of strategies of players in
coalition S ∈ N and s−S is the list of strategies of all other players, i.e., s−S = (sj)j∈N\S.
With a slight abuse of notation, we write si and s−i = (sj)j∈N\{i} for single-player coalitions
S = {i}.
It remains to specify the effectivity correspondence E of the social environment Γ. By
allowing for all coalitional deviations, we describe coalitional normal-form games. Formally,
for a coalition S ∈ N , the effectivity correspondence is such that S ∈ E(s, s′) if and only
if s−S = s′−S. For this effectivity correspondence, a strategy profile s ∈ Σ is a strong
Nash equilibrium (Aumann, 1959) if and only if it is in the core of the social environment
Γ = (N, (X, d), E, (i)i∈N). It follows that any strong Nash equilibrium must also be in the
MSS of the associated social environment.
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Instead of the coalitional approach, we will henceforth restrict attention to the more
frequently analyzed case of a non-cooperative game. In this case, the effectivity correspon-
dence E only allows singletons to move. Formally, we have that S ∈ E(s, s′) if and only if
s−S = s′−S and |S| = 1. A non-cooperative normal-form game G = (N, ((Σi, di), ui)i∈N) then
induces a social environment Γ = (N, (X, d), E, (i)i∈N) that is identical to the social envi-
ronment defined for normal-form games with coalitional moves, except that the effectivity
correspondence E only allows coalitions of size one.
A strategy profile s ∈ Σ is said to be a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game
G if for every i ∈ N and for every s′i ∈ Σi it holds that ui(s) ≥ ui(s′i, s−i). Note that a
strategy profile is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if it is in the core of the
social environment Γ. Corollary 3.15 then shows that every pure strategy Nash equilibrium
belongs to every MSS.
It is easy to see that the effectivity correspondence E is lower hemi-continuous. Moreover,
continuity of (i)i∈N is identical to continuity of the utility functions (ui)i∈N . As such,
Theorems 3.9 and 3.17 imply the following result.
Corollary 4.13. Let G = (N, ((Σi, di), ui)i∈N) be a normal-form game and let Γ be the
induced social environment. If the utility functions (ui)i∈N are continuous, then the MSS of
Γ is equal to the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria of G if and only if Γ satisfies the weak
improvement property.
In the next step, we define pseudo-potential games (Dubey, Haimanko, and Zapechelnyuk,
2006) and prove that the weak improvement property holds for this class of games.
Definition 4.14 (Pseudo-Potential Game). The game G = (N, ((Σi, di), ui)i∈N) is a pseudo-
potential game if there exists a continuous function P : Σ → R such that for all i ∈ N and
all s ∈ Σ,
arg max
si∈Σi
ui(si, s−i) ⊇ arg max
si∈Σi
P (si, s−i).
Pseudo-potential games generalize ordinal potential games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996)
and best-response potential games (Voorneveld, 2000). Moreover, Dubey, Haimanko, and
Zapechelnyuk (2006) show that the class of pseudo-potential games contains games of strate-
gic complements or substitutes with aggregation such as Cournot oligopoly games. Jensen
(2010) extends this result to generalized quasi-aggregative games.3
Theorem 4.15. Let G = (N, ((Σi, di), ui)i∈N) be a pseudo-potential game and let Γ be the
induced social environment. If the utility functions (ui)i∈N are continuous, then the MSS of
Γ coincides with the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria of G.
3Generalized quasi-aggregative games include aggregative games (Selten, 1970). For a subclass of aggrega-
tive games, the equivalence result in Theorem 4.15 could be obtained from Dindosˇ and Mezzetti (2006).
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For finite supermodular games, Friedman and Mezzetti (2001) establish the weak finite
improvement property which implies the weak improvement property. Thus, the equivalence
between the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria and the MSS also extends to this class of
games.
Mixed Environments Let G = (N, ((Σi, di), ui)i∈N) be a finite normal-form game, so for
each player i ∈ N it holds that Σi is finite and di(si, s′i) = 1{si 6=s′i}.
Let us now introduce the mixed extension G˜ = (N, ((∆i, δi), vi)i∈N) of G, where ∆i is the
set of probability distributions on Σi. For σi ∈ ∆i, σi,si denotes the probability that player i
uses pure strategy si. The metric δi on ∆i is defined by
δi(σi, σ
′
i) = max
si∈Σi
|σi,si − σ′i,si |.
We denote ∆ =
∏
i∈N ∆i and endow ∆ with the product metric δ(σ, σ
′) =
∑
i∈Nδi(σi, σ
′
i).
For a given strategy profile σ ∈ ∆, we denote the probability that pure strategy profile s ∈ Σ
is played by σs =
∏
i∈N σi,si . Let vi : ∆ → R be the expected utility associated to strategy
profiles σ ∈ ∆,
vi(σ) =
∑
s∈Σ
σsui(s).
Preferences (i)i∈N are such that σ i σ′ if and only if vi(σ) ≥ vi(σ′). The social environment
Γ˜ = (N, (∆, δ), E, (i)i∈N) corresponds to the game G˜ where E only allows singletons to
deviate and {i} ∈ E(σ, σ′) if and only if σ−i = σ′−i.
A strategy profile σ ∈ ∆ is said to be a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of G if it
is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of G˜. The core of Γ˜ coincides with the set of mixed
strategy Nash equilibria of G. Additionally, note that the expected utility functions (vi)i∈N
are continuous on ∆ and that E is lower hemi-continuous. As such, Theorems 3.9 and 3.17
give the following result.
Corollary 4.16. Let G˜ be the mixed extension of the finite normal-form game G and let Γ˜
be the social environment corresponding to G˜. The MSS of Γ˜ coincides with the set of mixed
strategy Nash equilibria of G if and only if Γ˜ satisfies the weak improvement property.
Clearly, the pure strategy Nash equilibria of G are also mixed strategy Nash equilibria
of G, so belong to the MSS of Γ˜. On the other hand, it is easy to find examples such that
some profiles in the MSS of Γ are not in the MSS of Γ˜.
A finite two-player game G = (N, ((Σi, di), ui)i∈{1,2}) is zero-sum if for all strategy profiles
s ∈ Σ, u1(s) + u2(s) = 0. The following result shows that for such games the MSS of Γ˜
coincides with the set of mixed strategy Nash equilibria of G.
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Theorem 4.17. Let G˜ be the mixed extension of a finite two-player zero-sum game G and
let Γ˜ be the social environment corresponding to G˜. Then the MSS of Γ˜ coincides with the
set of mixed strategy Nash equilibria of G.
As a final result, we show the equivalence between the set of mixed strategy Nash equi-
libria of G and the MSS of the social environment Γ˜ for finite two-player games where one
of the two players has two pure strategies.
Theorem 4.18. Let G˜ be the mixed-extension of a finite two-player game G and let Γ˜ be
the social environment corresponding to G˜. Assume that one player has two pure strategies
in G. Then the MSS of Γ˜ coincides with the set of mixed strategy Nash equilibria of G.
We analyzed the game of matching pennies in Example 3.21 and concluded that better-
response dynamics did not single out any strategy profile. The game of matching pennies
satisfies the assumptions of both Theorems 4.17 and 4.18. The MSS of this game therefore
consists of the unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium where each pure strategy is played
with probability 1/2.
5 Conclusion
The myopic stable set provides a solution concept for a wide variety of social environments.
As we have shown, the setting encompasses coalition function form games, models of network
formation, matching models, and non-cooperative games. These environments have been
chosen based on their prominence in the literature but are by no means exhaustive. In
particular, promising environments for future research on the myopic stable set include
exchange processes in general equilibrium models and many-to-many matching models with
transfers.
The following three features boost the appeal of the myopic stable set as a solution
concept. First, the myopic stable set unifies standard solution concepts in many social en-
vironments. For instance, it coincides with the coalition structure core in coalition function
form games (Ko´czy and Lauwers, 2004) if the coalition structure core is non-empty, the set of
stable matchings in the one-to-one matching model of Gale and Shapley (1962), the set con-
sisting of pairwise stable networks and closed cycles of networks (Jackson and Watts, 2002),
the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in finite supermodular games (Topkis, 1979 and
Milgrom and Roberts, 1990) and pseudo-potential games (Dubey, Haimanko, and Zapechel-
nyuk, 2006), and the set of mixed strategy Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum-games
and two-player games where one player has two actions.
Second, our solution concept exists for any social environment and—under weak conti-
nuity assumptions—provides a unique set-valued prediction. This differs from well-known
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concepts in the literature which fail to satisfy these properties even in social environments
with more structure. In important classes of problems, the MSS gives sharp predictions. For
instance, for matching markets empirical findings starting with Roth and Peranson (1999)
suggest that the core is small and Ashlagi, Kanoria, and Leshno (2017) provide theoretical
arguments for why this is the case. The equivalence between the core of matching problems
and the MSS then implies that MSS has significant predictive power. Other examples are
the equivalence between MSS and the set of pure Nash equilibria pseudo-potential games
and finite supermodular games and between the MSS and the set of mixed Nash equilibria
in two-player zero-sum games and in two-player normal-form games with one player having
two actions.
At the same time, there are cases where the MSS may be large. For example, when the
MSS contains states that do not belong to the core as in the matching model by Knuth
(1976) as discussed in Section 4.2. Intuitively, the combination of myopic behavior and a
restrictive effectivity correspondence may result in cycling and hence, a large MSS. This re-
flects the trade-off between a general solution concept for which existence and non-emptiness
is guaranteed, like the MSS, and a clear prediction for every class of social environments.
The investigation of refinements of the MSS in such cases is a natural direction for future
research.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 3.1: First observe that the set of states X is a QMSS. Indeed, since
it is compact, it is closed and it trivially satisfies deterrence of external deviations and
asymptotic external stability.
Let Z be the collection of all sets of states that are a QMSS. Notice that Z is non-empty
as X ∈ Z. A set Z ′ ∈ Z is a maximal element in the partially ordered set (Z,⊇) if for all
Z ∈ Z with Z ′ ⊇ Z, we have Z = Z ′. We will use Zorn’s lemma to show the existence of a
maximal element in the partially ordered set (Z,⊇).
Let S be a chain in Z, i.e., (S,⊇) is a totally ordered subset of (Z,⊇). Let I be an index
set for the sets in S, i.e., S = {Zα|α ∈ I}. Let . be the order on I that is induced by the
order on S, i.e., β . α if and only if Zα ⊇ Zβ. In order to apply Zorn’s Lemma, we have to
show that S has an upper bound in Z. Let M = ⋂α∈I Zα. Clearly, M is an upper bound of
S. We proceed by showing that M ∈ Z, i.e., M is a QMSS. First of all, observe that M is
closed as it is defined as the intersection of a collection of closed sets. We need to show that
it satisfies deterrence of external deviations and asymptotic external stability.
Deterrence of external deviations: Let x ∈M and y /∈M be given. Then there is α ∈ I
such that y /∈ Zα, since otherwise y ∈ Zα for all α ∈ I, which means that y ∈ M . Since
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x ∈ Zα and Zα satisfies deterrence of external deviations, we obtain y /∈ f(x) as was to be
shown.
Asymptotic external stability: Consider some y /∈ M . Then there is α ∈ I such that
y /∈ Zα. As S is a chain, it follows that for all β . α we have y /∈ Zβ.
For every β . α, there is xβ ∈ Zβ such that xβ ∈ f∞(y), since Zβ satisfies asymptotic
external stability. This defines a net (xβ)β.α. Given that X is compact, it follows by
Theorem 2.31 of Aliprantis and Border (2006) that this net has a convergent subnet, say
(xβ
′
)β′∈I′ , where I ′ ⊆ I is such that for all β ∈ I there is a β′ ∈ I ′ such that β′ . β. Let x be
the limit of this convergent subnet. We split the remaining part of the proof in two steps.
First, we show that x ∈M . Second, we show that x ∈ f∞(y).
Step 1: x ∈M : Towards a contradiction, suppose that x /∈ M . Then, there exists γ ∈ I
such that x /∈ Zγ. In particular, given that Zγ is a closed set, there is ε > 0 such that
Bε(x) ∩ Zγ = ∅. Since S is a chain, we have that Bε(x) ∩ Zδ = ∅ for all δ . γ. Since x is the
limit of the subnet (xβ
′
)β′∈I′ , there is γ′ ∈ I ′ such that γ′ . γ and xγ′ ∈ Bε(x). Then we have
xγ
′ ∈ Zγ′ , xγ′ ∈ Bε(x), and Bε(x) ∩ Zγ′ = ∅, a contradiction. We conclude that x ∈M .
Step 2: x ∈ f∞(y): We need to show that for every ε > 0 there is k ∈ N and x ∈ fk(y)
such that x ∈ Bε(x).
Let some ε > 0 be given. The subnet (xβ
′
)β′∈I′ converges to x. As such, there exists
γ′ ∈ I ′ such that xγ′ ∈ Bε/2(x). In addition, xγ′ ∈ f∞(y), so there is k ∈ N and x ∈ fk(y)
such that x ∈ Bε/2(xγ′). Then, by the triangle inequality, it holds that x ∈ Bε(x). Together
with x ∈ fk(y), this concludes the proof, i.e., x ∈ f∞(y). 2
Proof of Theorem 3.2: Let x ∈ M and y ∈ f∞(x) and suppose, towards a contra-
diction, that y /∈M . Given that M is closed, there is ε > 0 such that Bε(y) ∩M = ∅. Also,
by definition, there is k ∈ N and z ∈ fk(x) such that z ∈ Bε(y), i.e. z /∈M . Since z ∈ fk(x),
there is a sequence z0, z1, . . . , zk of length k such that
z0 = x, z1 ∈ f(z0), . . . , zk = z ∈ f(zk−1).
Let k′ ∈ {1, . . . , k} be such that zk′ is the first element in this sequence with the property
that zk
′
/∈M . Given that z0 = x ∈M and zk = z /∈M , such an element exists. It holds that
zk
′−1 ∈ M , zk′ ∈ f(zk′−1), and zk′ /∈ M . This contradicts deterrence of external deviations
for M . 2
Proof of Theorem 3.3: Consider a state x1 ∈ M1. If x1 ∈ M2, then we are done.
Otherwise, by asymptotic external stability of M2, we know that there is x2 ∈M2 such that
x2 ∈ f∞(x1). Theorem 3.2 tells us that x2 ∈M1, so x2 ∈M1 ∩M2. 2
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The following technical lemma is helpful in proving uniqueness of an MSS, i.e. Theo-
rem 3.6.
Lemma A.1. If the dominance correspondence f : X → X is lower hemi-continuous, then
the asymptotic dominance correspondence f∞ : X → X is transitive.
Proof. Let x, y, z ∈ X be such that y ∈ f∞(x) and z ∈ f∞(y). We have to show that
z ∈ f∞(x), so we need to show that for every ε > 0, there is k′ ∈ N and z′ ∈ fk′(x) such
that z′ ∈ Bε(z).
By assumption, z ∈ f∞(y), so there is k ∈ N and z1 ∈ fk(y) such that z1 ∈ Bε/2(z). In
addition, as y ∈ f∞(x), we know that for every ` ∈ N there is k` ∈ N and y` ∈ fk`(x) such
that y` ∈ B1/`(y). This generates a sequence (y`)`∈N that converges to y, i.e., y` → y.
Note that fk is lower hemi-continuous, since it is a composition of k lower hemi-continuous
correspondences. Given lower hemi-continuity of fk and the fact that z1 ∈ fk(y), we know
that there is a sequence (z`2)`∈N such that z
`
2 → z1 and z`2 ∈ fk(y`). Now, we have that
y` ∈ fk`(x) and z`2 ∈ fk(y`), which gives z`2 ∈ fk+k`(x).
We take ` large enough such that z`2 ∈ Bε/2(z1). Since z1 ∈ Bε/2(z), the triangular
inequality gives z`2 ∈ Bε(z). This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3.6: Suppose not, then, by Theorems 3.1 and 3.3, there exists an
MSS M1 and an MSS M2 such that M1 6= M2 and their intersection M3 = M1 ∩M2 is non-
empty. Let us show that M3 is a QMSS, contradicting the minimality of M1 and M2, and
establishing the uniqueness of the MSS. First of all, notice that M3, being the intersection
of two closed sets, is also closed.
For deterrence of external deviations, let x ∈ M3 and y ∈ f(x). Then given that x ∈ M1
and M1 satisfies deterrence of external deviations, it must be that y ∈ M1. Also given that
x ∈ M2 and M2 satisfies deterrence of external deviations, it must be that y ∈ M2. This
implies that y ∈M1 ∩M2 = M3 as was to be shown.
For asymptotic external stability, take any y /∈M3. There are three cases to consider.
Case 1: y ∈M1 \M3: Then, by asymptotic external stability of M2, there is x ∈M2 such
that x ∈ f∞(y). By Theorem 3.2, we have that x ∈M1. This means that x ∈M1∩M2 = M3,
which is what we needed to show.
Case 2: y ∈M2 \M3: The proof is symmetric to Case 1 with M1 and M2 interchanged.
Case 3: y ∈ X \ (M1 ∪M2): We know, by asymptotic external stability of M1, that
there is x ∈ M1 such that x ∈ f∞(y). If x ∈ M3, we are done. If not, we know from Case 1
above that there is z ∈ M3 such that z ∈ f∞(x). It follows from x ∈ f∞(y) and z ∈ f∞(x)
that z ∈ f∞(y) by Lemma A.1. 2
32
Proof of Theorem 3.9: Let x, y ∈ X and sequences (xk)k∈N and (yk)k∈N in X such
that xk → x and yk → y be given. Let us first show that if individual i ∈ N strictly prefers
y to x, so y i x, then there is ` ∈ N such that for all k ≥ `, yk i xk. Suppose not, then for
every ` ∈ N we can find k` ≥ ` such that xk` i yk` . This creates sequences (xk`)`∈N, (yk`)`∈N
in X with xk` → x and yk` → y such that, for every ` ∈ N, xk` i yk` . By continuity of i,
it holds that x i y, a contradiction.
Let (xk)k∈N be a sequence in X such that xk → x and consider some y ∈ f(x). Then
either y = x or y 6= x and there is a coalition S ∈ E(x, y) such that, for every i ∈ S, y i x.
If y = x, take the sequence (yk)k∈N in X defined by yk = xk. We immediately have that,
for every k ∈ N, yk ∈ f(xk), and yk → y.
We now consider the case where y 6= x and there is a coalition S ∈ E(x, y) such that,
for every i ∈ S, y i x. By lower hemi-continuity of the correspondence GS, we know that
there is a sequence (yk)k∈N such that yk ∈ GS(xk) and yk → y. By the first paragraph of the
proof, we know that for every i ∈ S there is `i ∈ N such that, for every k ≥ `i, yk i xk. Let
` = maxi∈S `i. Then, for every k ≥ `, for every i ∈ S, yk i xk, and S ∈ E(xk, yk), which
shows that yk ∈ f(xk). The sequence (zk)k∈N defined by zk = xk if k < ` and zk = yk if
k ≥ ` therefore has all the desired properties: for every k ∈ N, zk ∈ f(xk), and zk → y. 2
Proof of Theorem 3.13: Towards a contradiction, suppose there is a closed cycle C
which is not a subset of M . Let x ∈ C and x /∈ M . By asymptotic external stability there
is y ∈ M such that y ∈ f∞(x). By definition of a closed cycle, it follows that y ∈ C. As
x ∈ C, again by definition of a closed cycle, we also have that x ∈ f∞(y). By Theorem 3.2,
it follows that x ∈ M , a contradiction. Since the choice of C was arbitrary, we have shown
that CC ⊆M .
We show next that if X is finite, then CC = M . Since CC ⊆ M , we only need to show
that CC is a QMSS. The set CC satisfies deterrence of external deviations, since for all
x ∈ CC, f(x) ⊆ f∞(x) ⊆ CC. It remains to verify asymptotic external stability of CC, i.e.,
for every state x /∈ CC, f∞(x) ∩ CC 6= ∅.
Let x /∈ CC and define Y = f∞(x). Note that Y is non-empty since x ∈ f(x). It also
holds that Y is finite and f∞(y) ⊆ Y for every y ∈ Y . Let us represent the set Y and
the dominance correspondence f on Y by a finite directed graph D, i.e., (i) Y is the set of
vertices of D and (ii) D has an arc from y to z if and only if z ∈ f(y). By contracting each
strongly connected component of D to a single vertex, we obtain a directed acyclic graph,
which is called the condensation of D. As the condensation is finite and acyclic, it has a
maximal element, say c. Observe that c represents a closed cycle C, so Y ∩ CC 6= ∅. 2
Proof of Theorem 3.17: Assume that Γ satisfies the weak improvement property.
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Let M be an MSS of Γ. By Corollary 3.15, we have CO ⊆ M . We will show that CO is a
QMSS. By minimality, it then follows that CO = M .
In order to see that CO is closed, let (xk)k∈N be a sequence in CO, so for all k ∈ N it holds
that f(xk) = {xk}. Now assume that xk → x and x /∈ CO. This means that there is y 6= x
such that y ∈ f(x). By lower hemi-continuity of f , there is a sequence (yk)k∈N such that
yk ∈ f(xk) and yk → y. As for all k ∈ N, xk ∈ CO, we have that yk = xk, which means that
yk → x, so y = x, a contradiction. Deterrence of external deviations is immediate for the
core as it is the union of the sinks. If the social environment satisfies the weak improvement
property, we have that for all x /∈ CO, f∞(x) ∩ CO 6= ∅, thus the core satisfies asymptotic
external stability.
For the reverse, let M be an MSS equal to CO. Now, if x ∈ M , it is a sink, so
f∞(x) = {x} ⊆ CO. If x /∈ CO we have by asymptotic external stability of M that
f∞(x) ∩M 6= ∅, so f∞(x) contains a sink, i.e., Γ satisfies the weak improvement property.
2
Proof of Theorem 3.19: Suppose, towards a contradiction, that M is an MSS such
that M ∩ V = ∅. Recall that M is non-empty. Let x ∈ M and x /∈ V. Since V satisfies
external stability, there is y ∈ f(x) such that y ∈ V. Since M satisfies deterrence of external
deviations, we have that y ∈M, so M ∩ V 6= ∅, a contradiction. 2
Proof of Theorem 3.20: By Theorem 3.13, the MSS is unique and equal to the union
of all closed cycles CC. Since Q is consistent with f, a state is recurrent if and only if it
belongs to a closed cycle. 2
Proof of Theorem 3.22: According to Proposition 4.2.1 of Meyn and Tweedie (1993),
we have to show that for every x ∈ X \ {x∗}, for every A ∈ B(X \ {x∗}) such that ϕ(A) > 0,
there exists k ∈ N such that Qk(x,A) > 0, where Qk(x,A) denotes the probability of reaching
A from x in k transitions.
It is convenient to partition the set X \ {x∗} in four subsets,
X1 = {x ∈ X | x1 ≤ 12 , x2 > 12},
X2 = {x ∈ X | x1 > 12 , x2 ≥ 12},
X3 = {x ∈ X | x1 ≥ 12 , x2 < 12},
X4 = {x ∈ X | x1 < 12 , x2 ≤ 12}.
Let some x ∈ X4 and some A ∈ B(X \ {x∗}) such that ϕ(A) > 0 be given. We partition
A in the four subsets A1 ⊆ X1, A2 ⊆ X2, A3 ⊆ X3, and A4 ⊆ X4. At least one of these
four sets has positive Lebesgue measure. From x, the probability to reach a point in the set
Y 1 = {y1 ∈ X1 | y11 = x1} is at least 1/3 and the probability distribution over Y 1 is uniform.
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From y1 ∈ Y 1, the probability to reach a point in the set Y 2(y1) = {y2 ∈ X2 | y22 = y12} is
at least 1/3 and the probability distribution over Y 2(y1) is uniform. Thus, the probability
to reach a point in X2 after 2 transitions is at least 1/9 and, conditional on reaching X2,
the distribution of this point is uniform on X2. It now follows that Q2(x,A) ≥ ϕ(A2)/9.
Repeating this argument, we find that Q3(x,A) ≥ ϕ(A3)/27, Q4(x,A) ≥ ϕ(A4)/81, and
Q5(x,A) ≥ ϕ(A1)/243. Since at least one of A1, A2, A3, and A4 has strictly positive Lebesgue
measure, we have shown that the restriction of the Markov process toX\{x∗} is ϕ-irreducible.
An analogous argument holds for x ∈ X i, where i 6= 4. 2
Proof of Theorem 4.3: To show lower hemi-continuity of E, let some S ∈ N , a
sequence (xk)k∈N in X such that xk → x, and some y ∈ GS(x) be given. We show that there
is a sequence (yk)k∈N such that yk ∈ GS(xk) and yk → y. If y = x, then the choice yk = xk
would do, so consider the case y 6= x.
First of all, there is k′ ∈ N such that for all k ≥ k′, pi(xk) = pi(x), so in particular
U(xk, S) = U(x, S). For every k < k′, we define yk = xk. For every k ≥ k′, we define yk ∈ X
by pi(yk) = pi(y) and
ui(y
k) =
{
ui(y), i ∈ N \ U(x, S),
ui(x
k), i ∈ U(x, S).
This completely specifies the state yk. Consider some k ≥ k′. Since y 6= x and y ∈ GS(x), it
holds that S ∈ pi(y) and, for every i ∈ N \ (S ∪U(x, S)), we have that i is a residual player.
The properties of the γ-model imply that {i} ∈ pi(y). The same properties hold for pi(yk).
For every i ∈ S, it holds that ui(yk) = ui(y), so ui(yk) ≥ v({i}) and
∑
i∈S ui(y
k) = v(S).
For every i ∈ N \ (S ∪U(x, S)), we have that ui(yk) = v({i}) = ui(y). For every i ∈ U(x, S)
it holds that ui(y) = ui(x) and ui(y
k) = ui(x
k). By coalitional sovereignty, we have that
yk ∈ GS(xk). Using that xk → x, it follows easily that yk → y.
Let some i ∈ N be given. To show continuity of i, let (xk)k∈N and (yk)k∈N be se-
quences in X such that xk → x and yk → y. Then, by continuity of the projection, we
have that ui(x
k)→ ui(x) and ui(yk)→ ui(y). So if ui(xk) ≥ ui(yk) for all k ∈ N, we obtain
ui(x) ≥ ui(y), which shows that x i y. 2
Proof of Theorem 4.6: Let Y be the coalition structure core of (N, v). Let y ∈ CO
and suppose y /∈ Y . Then there is a coalition S ∈ N such that ∑i∈S ui(y) < v(S). Since
y ∈ X, it holds for all i ∈ S that ui(y) ≥ v({i}). Now, let uS be a vector of payoffs for
the members in S such that
∑
i∈S ui = v(S) and for all i ∈ S, ui > ui(y). Then, by full
support, there exists a state y′ ∈ X such that S ∈ E(y, y′) and uS = uS(y′). We conclude
that y′ ∈ f(y). This contradicts the fact that y ∈ CO.
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For the reverse, let y ∈ Y and suppose there is z ∈ f(y) such that z 6= y, i.e., y /∈ CO.
Then there is S ∈ E(y, z) such that for all i ∈ S it holds that ui(z) > ui(y). Also,
v(S) =
∑
i∈S
ui(z) >
∑
i∈S
ui(y) ≥ v(S),
where the first equality follows from the definition of the state space and the last inequality
from the definition of Y . We have obtained a contradiction. 2
Proof of Theorem 4.8: From Theorem 4.3 we know that f is lower hemi-continuous.
Theorem 4.6 shows that Y is equal to the core of Γ. If we can show that Γ satisfies the
weak improvement property whenever Y 6= ∅, then we can use Theorem 3.17 to establish our
result. Since the proof is trivial when the number of individuals n is equal to 1, we assume
n ≥ 2 throughout.
Assume that Y 6= ∅. We need to show that for all x0 ∈ X, f∞(x0) ∩ Y 6= ∅. If x0 in
Y , then nothing needs to be shown, so assume that x0 ∈ X \ Y . We need to show that for
every ε > 0 there is a number k′ ∈ N, a state xk′ ∈ fk′(x0), and a state y ∈ Y such that
d(xk
′
, y) < ε.
Let some ε > 0 be given. Be´al, Re´mila, and Solal (2013) show that there exists a sequence
of states (x0, . . . , xk
′
) such that xk
′ ∈ Y , k′ is less than or equal to (n2 + 4n)/4, and, for
every k ∈ {1, . . . , k′},
1. there is Sk ∈ N such that Sk ∈ E(xk−1, xk),
2. uSk(x
k−1) < uSk(xk).
Notice that the inequality in 2. only means that at least one of the players in Sk gets a
strictly higher payoff, though not necessarily all of them. Let P k be the set of partners of
the players in Sk at state xk−1, more formally defined as
P k = ∪{S∈pi(xk−1)|S∩Sk 6=∅}S,
so P k is equal to the moving coalition Sk together with the residual players. Since Sk ∈
E(xk−1, xk), it follows that
ui(x
k) = v({i}), i ∈ P k \ Sk,
ui(x
k) = ui(x
k−1), i ∈ N \ P k.
We define W k ⊂ Sk to be the, possibly empty, proper subset of Sk consisting of players that
only weakly improve when moving from state xk−1 to state xk, so for every i ∈ W k it holds
that ui(x
k−1) = ui(xk). We define
δ = mink∈{1,...,k′}mini∈Sk\Wk ui(xk)− ui(xk−1),
ε′ = min{δ, ε},
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so δ is the smallest improvement of any of the strictly improving players involved in any
move along the sequence. It holds that δ > 0 and therefore that ε′ > 0. For k ∈ {0, . . . , k′},
define
νk =
n2k
n2k′+1
.
We define e(W k) = 0 ifW k = ∅ and e(W k) = 1 otherwise. We use the sequence (x0, x1, . . . , xk′)
of states as constructed by Be´al, Re´mila, and Solal (2013) to define a new sequence (x˜0, x˜1, . . . , x˜k
′
)
of states by setting x˜0 = x0 and, for every k ∈ {1, . . . , k′},
pi(x˜k) = pi(xk),
ui(x˜
k) = ui(x
k) + ε′νk
|Sk\Wk|
|Wk| , i ∈ W k,
ui(x˜
k) = ui(x
k)− ε′νke(W k), i ∈ Sk \W k,
ui(x˜
k) = ui(x
k) = v({i}), i ∈ P k \ Sk,
ui(x˜
k) = ui(x˜
k−1), i ∈ N \ P k.
Notice that the first line does not entail a division by zero, since if i ∈ W k, then W k 6= ∅.
Compared to the sequence (x0, x1, . . . , xk
′
), the sequence (x˜0, x˜1, . . . , x˜k
′
) is such that each
strictly improving player in Sk \W k donates an amount ε′νk/|W k| to each of the players in
W k whenever the latter set is non-empty. It is also important to observe that the fraction
νk is an n
2 multiple of νk−1 and that νk′ = 1/n.
We show first by induction that, for every k ∈ {0, . . . , k′}, x˜k ∈ X. Obviously, it holds
that x˜0 = x0 ∈ X. Assume that, for some k ∈ {1, . . . , k′}, x˜k−1 ∈ X. We show that x˜k ∈ X.
It holds that
ui(x˜
k) > ui(x
k) ≥ v({i}), i ∈ W k,
ui(x˜
k) ≥ ui(xk−1) + δ − ε′νk > ui(xk−1) + δ − ε′ ≥ ui(xk−1) ≥ v({i}), i ∈ Sk \W k,
ui(x˜
k) = v({i}), i ∈ P k \ Sk,
ui(x˜
k) = ui(x˜
k−1) ≥ v({i}), i ∈ N \ P k,
where the very last inequality follows from the induction hypothesis. Moreover, for every
S ∈ pi(xk), it holds that either S = Sk and W k = ∅, so∑
i∈S
ui(x˜
k) =
∑
i∈Sk
ui(x
k) = v(S),
or S = Sk and W k 6= ∅, so∑
i∈S
ui(x˜
k) =
∑
i∈Wk
(
ui(x
k) + ε′νk
|Sk \W k|
|W k|
)
+
∑
i∈Sk\Wk
(
ui(x
k)− ε′νk
)
=
∑
i∈Sk
ui(x
k) = v(S),
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or S = {i′} with i′ ∈ P k \ Sk and∑
i∈S
ui(x˜
k) = ui′(x˜
k) = ui′(x
k) = v({i′}) = v(S),
or S ⊆ N \ P k, so S ∈ pi(x˜k−1), and∑
i∈S
ui(x˜
k) =
∑
i∈S
ui(x˜
k−1) = v(S),
where the last equality makes use of the induction hypothesis. We have now completed the
proof of the fact that for every k ∈ {0, . . . , k′}, x˜k ∈ X.
We show next by induction that, for every k ∈ {0, . . . , k′}, and for every i ∈ N ,
|ui(x˜k)− ui(xk)| ≤ ε′νk(n− 1).
Obviously, for every i ∈ N , it holds that |ui(x˜0) − ui(x0)| = 0 ≤ ε′ν0(n − 1). Assume that,
for some k ∈ {1, . . . , k′}, for every i ∈ N , |ui(x˜k−1) − ui(xk−1)| ≤ ε′νk−1(n − 1). We show
that, for every i ∈ N , |ui(x˜k) − ui(xk)| ≤ ε′νk(n − 1). If i ∈ W k, then W k 6= ∅, and the
statement follows from the observation that
0 ≤ ui(x˜k)− ui(xk) = ε′νk |Sk\Wk||Wk| ≤ ε′νk(n− 1).
If i ∈ Sk \W k, then we have that
0 ≥ ui(x˜k)− ui(xk) ≥ −ε′νk ≥ −ε′νk(n− 1).
If i ∈ P k \ Sk, then we have |ui(x˜k)− ui(xk)| = 0. If i ∈ N \ P k, then it holds that
|ui(x˜k)− ui(xk)| = |ui(x˜k−1)− ui(xk−1)| ≤ ε′νk−1(n− 1) < ε′νk(n− 1),
where the first inequality makes use of the induction hypothesis and the last inequality of
the fact that νk−1 < νk.
Let some k ∈ {1, . . . , k′} and some i ∈ Sk be given. We show that ui(x˜k) > ui(x˜k−1). If
i ∈ W k, then it holds that
ui(x˜
k) = ui(x
k) + ε′νk
|Sk \W k|
|W k|
= ui(x
k−1) + ε′νk
|Sk \W k|
|W k|
≥ ui(x˜k−1)− ε′νk−1(n− 1) + ε′νk 1
n− 1
> ui(x˜
k−1),
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where the strict inequality uses that νk = n
2νk−1. If i ∈ Sk \W k, then it holds that
ui(x˜
k) ≥ ui(xk)− ε′νk
≥ ui(xk−1) + δ − ε′νk
≥ ui(x˜k−1)− ε′νk−1(n− 1) + δ − ε′n2νk−1
> ui(x˜
k−1),
where the strict inequality uses the facts that δ ≥ ε′ and
(n2 + (n− 1))νk−1 < 2n2νk−1 ≤ 2νk ≤ 1.
Combining the statements proven so far, it follows that x˜k
′ ∈ fk′(x0). We complete the proof
of the weak improvement property by noting that xk
′ ∈ Y by the result of Be´al, Re´mila, and
Solal (2013) and by observing that d(x˜k
′
, xk
′
) < ε since pi(x˜k
′
) = pi(xk
′
) and, for every i ∈ N ,
|ui(x˜k′)− ui(xk′)| ≤ ε′νk′(n− 1) < ε′ ≤ ε.
2
Proof of Theorem 4.11: To apply Theorem 3.17, we show first that the core of Γ is
equal to the set of Pareto efficient house allocations Y , i.e. for every A ∈ X it holds that
f(A) = {A} if and only if A ∈ Y.
“⇒” Suppose A /∈ Y. Then there is A′ ∈ X such that, for every i ∈ N, A′ i A and for
some j ∈ N, A′ j A. Let S = {i ∈ N | A′ i A} be the set of agents that strictly prefer A′
to A. Since preferences are strict, for every i ∈ N \ S, we have Ai = A′i. It therefore holds
that S ∈ E(A,A′), so A′ ∈ f(A), a contradiction.
“⇐” Suppose A′ ∈ X \{A} belongs to f(A). Then there is S ∈ N such that S ∈ E(A,A′)
and, for every i ∈ S, A′ i A. Since for every i ∈ N \ S, Ai = A′i, it is immediate that A′
Pareto dominates A, so A /∈ Y, a contradiction.
Since the state space X is finite, the correspondence f is lower hemi-continuous.
We complete the proof by showing that Γ satisfies the weak improvement property, so
for every A ∈ X, f∞(A) ∩ Y 6= ∅. If A ∈ Y, then evidently f∞(A) ∩ Y 6= ∅. Consider the
case A /∈ Y. We apply the top trading cycle algorithm of Shapley and Scarf (1974) and, since
preferences are assumed to be strict, we find a Pareto optimal allocation A′ ∈ Y. It follows
that A′ ∈ fN(A) ∩ Y = f∞(A) ∩ Y. 2
Proof of Theorem 4.15: Given Corollary 4.13 it suffices to show that Γ satisfies the
weak improvement property.
Consider a function b : Σ→ Σ such that, for every s ∈ Σ,
b(s) ∈ arg max{τ∈Σ|∃i∈N, τ−i=s−i}P (τ),
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and b(s) = s if P (b(s)) = P (s). For each strategy profile s ∈ Σ, there is j ∈ N and τ ∗j ∈ Σj
such that b(s) = (τ ∗j , s−j) and b(s) maximizes the value of P (τ) over all strategies τ such
that there is i ∈ N with τ−i = s−i. If the maximal value of P (τ) is equal to P (s), then b(s) is
taken equal to s. As P is continuous and, for every i ∈ N , Σi is compact, the maximization
problem has a solution.
Observe that s ∈ Σ is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of G if and only if
P (s) ≥ P (τi, s−i), i ∈ N, τi ∈ Σi.
It follows that s is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of G if and only if b(s) = s. Let NE be
the set of all pure strategy Nash equilibria of G. The set NE is non-empty as it contains all
the strategy profiles that maximize P over Σ, a non-empty set since P is continuous and Σ
is compact.
Let us show that Γ satisfies the weak improvement property, i.e. for all states s ∈ Σ,
f∞(s) ∩ NE 6= ∅.
Let s1 ∈ Σ \ NE be given. Consider the sequence of states (sk)k∈N in Σ defined by
s2 = b(s1), s3 = b(s2), . . .
For every k ∈ N, it holds that sk+1 ∈ f(sk), so any accumulation point of the sequence
(sk)k∈N belongs to f∞(s1).
Observe that, by definition, P (s1) ≤ P (s2) ≤ P (s3) ≤ · · · , so the sequence (P (sk))
k∈N
is non-decreasing. Further, as (sk)k∈N takes values in the compact set Σ, it has a convergent
subsequence. Let us denote such a subsequence by (x`)`∈N and let x` → x. It holds that
x ∈ f∞(s1). By continuity of P it holds that P (x`) → P (x). It also holds that, for every
k ∈ N, P (sk) ≤ P (x).
Since x ∈ f∞(s1), we finish the proof by showing that x ∈ NE. Suppose not, then there is
j ∈ N and a best response τ ′j ∈ Σj such that uj(τ ′j, x−j) > uj(x). As G is a pseudo-potential
game, there is a best response τ ∗j ∈ Σj such that
P (τ ∗j , x−j) > P (x).
Since P is continuous, there is ε > 0 such that for every τ ∈ Bε((τ ∗j , x−j)) it holds that
P (τ) > P (x).
Since x` → x, there is `′ ∈ N such that x`′ ∈ Bε(x), so (τ ∗j , x`′−j) ∈ Bε((τ ∗j , x−j)) and
P (τ ∗j , x
`′
−j) > P (x).
We have that
P (x) < P ((τ ∗j , x
`′
−j)) ≤ P (b(s`
′
)) ≤ P (x),
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a contradiction. Consequently, it holds that x ∈ NE. 2
Proof of Theorem 4.17: Using Corollary 4.16, it remains to show that Γ˜ satisfies the
weak improvement property, i.e., for every strategy profile σ ∈ ∆, f∞(σ) contains a mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium of G. Let v denote the value of the game.
Let some σ ∈ ∆ be given which is not a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of G, i.e., there
is a player i such that σi is not a minmax strategy. We distinguish between two cases.
Case 1: σ1 and σ2 are not minmax strategies.
1.1 If v1(σ) 6= v, then there exists a player i who is below his minmax payoff. Without
loss of generality, let this be player 1, so v1(σ) < v. Let (σ
∗
1, σ
∗
2) be a profile of minmax
strategies. Note that v1(σ
∗
1, σ2) ≥ v. Since σ2 is not a minmax strategy, there exists a
pure strategy s1 ∈ ∆1 such that v1(s1, σ2) > v. Thus, for every ε ∈ (0, 2], it holds that
v1(
ε
2
s1 + (1− ε2)σ∗1, σ2) > v.
It holds that
v2(
ε
2
s1 + (1− ε2)σ∗1, σ∗2) ≥ −v,
so for every  > 0, f 2(σ) contains a state which is in an ε-neighborhood of a mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium of G, and therefore f∞(σ) contains a mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium of G.
1.2 Suppose v1(σ) = v. Then, there exists a pure strategy s1 ∈ ∆1 such that
v1(s1, σ2) > v,
since otherwise σ2 would be a minmax strategy. If s1 is a minmax strategy, then
player 2 can deviate to a minmax strategy σ∗2 to obtain v2(s1, σ
∗
2) = −v, i.e., f 2(σ)
contains a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of G. If s1 is not a minmax strategy, then
(s1, σ2) ∈ f1(σ) is a state as in Case 1.1, so for every ε > 0, f 3(σ) contains a state
which is in a ε-neighborhood of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of G, and therefore
f∞(σ) contains a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of G.
Case 2: σ1 is a minmax strategy and σ2 is not, or σ1 is not a minmax strategy and σ2 is.
Without loss of generality, assume σ1 is a minmax strategy.
2.1 If v1(σ) > v, then player 2 can profitably switch to a minmax strategy σ
∗
2 and we are
done.
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2.2 If v1(σ) = v, then since σ2 is not a minmax strategy, there exists a deviation to a
pure strategy s1 ∈ ∆1 such that v1(s1, σ2) > v. If s1 is a minmax strategy, then
(s1, σ2) ∈ f1(σ) is a state as in Case 2.1, so f2(σ) contains a mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium of G. If s1 is not a minmax strategy, then (s1, σ2) ∈ f1(σ) is a state as
in Case 1.1, and for every ε > 0 it holds that f 3(σ) contains a state which is in an
ε-neighborhood of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of G, so f∞(σ) contains a mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium of G.
2
Proof of Theorem 4.18: Assume without loss of generality that player 1 has two
pure strategies. Let the set of pure strategies of player 1 be {U,D} with generic element
A ∈ {U,D} and let the set of pure strategies of player 2 be given by {s1, . . . , s`} with generic
element sj. We also use the notation U and D for the mixed strategy that puts probability 1
on pure strategy U and D, respectively, and similarly for sj.
Let some σ ∈ ∆ be given. By Corollary 4.16, it suffices to show the weak improvement
property of Γ˜, i.e., f∞(σ) contains a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of G. We distinguish
between two cases.
Case 1: G has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, without loss of generality, (U, s∗).
If σ is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of G, we are done, so assume σ is not a mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium of G. If player 2 has a profitable deviation from σ, then there is a
pure strategy best response sj ∈ ∆2 such that (σ1, sj) ∈ f(σ). If (σ1, sj) is a mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium of G, we are done. If not, then player 1 must have a pure strategy best
response to (σ1, s
j), say A. Thus, f 2(σ) contains a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of G
or a pure strategy profile (A, sj). The same conclusion holds if player 1 has a profitable
deviation from σ. If the pure strategy profile (A, sj) is a Nash equilibrium of G, we are done.
If not, at least one player has a profitable deviation from it. We distinguish between two
cases.
1.1 A = D.
1.1.a Assume player 1 can profitably deviate from (D, sj). Then it holds that (U, sj) ∈
f(D, sj). If (U, sj) is a Nash equilibrium of G, we are done. If not, then player 2
can profitably deviate to the Nash equilibrium (U, s∗) of G and we are done.
1.1.b Assume player 2 can profitably deviate from (D, sj). Let sh be a best response
for player 2, so (D, sh) ∈ f(D, sj). If this is a Nash equilibrium of G, we are
done. Otherwise, player 1 can profitably deviate to (D, sh), which brings us back
to Case 1.1.a.
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1.2 A = U.
1.2.a Assume player 2 can profitably deviate form (U, sj). It holds that the Nash equi-
librium (U, s∗) of G belongs to f(U, sj), so we are done.
1.2.b Assume player 1 can profitably deviate from (U, sj). Then it holds that (D, sj) ∈
f(U, sj). If (D, sj) is a Nash equilibrium of G, then we are done. Else, player 2
must have a profitable deviation from (D, sj), which brings us back to Case 1.1.b.
Case 2: G has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
We first show that in every mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of G, player 1 plays both U
and D with strictly positive probability. Towards a contradiction, suppose there is a mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium (A, σ∗2) of G such that player 1 plays a pure strategy, without loss
of generality, strategy A = U . It holds that any pure strategy of player 2 in the support of
σ∗2 is a best response against U. Since G has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium, it must hold
that playing D against any pure strategy in the support of σ∗2 gives player 1 a strictly higher
payoff than playing U. It follows that D is a profitable deviation for player 1 from (U, σ∗2).
This contradicts (U, σ∗2) being a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of G.
To finish the proof, we show that f∞(σ) contains a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of
G. As in the first part of Case 1, we can show that f 2(σ) contains a mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium of G and we are done, or a pure strategy profile which is not a Nash equilibrium
of G. Player 1 or player 2 has a profitable deviation from this pure strategy profile. In the
latter case, player 2 can choose a pure strategy best response and in the next step, player 1
can profitably deviate to a pure strategy. In both cases it holds that there is k ∈ N such that
fk(σ) contains a pure strategy profile (A, sj) from which player 1 has a profitable deviation.
Without loss of generality, let A = U .
Observe that for player 1 any completely mixed strategy is a profitable deviation from
(U, sj). Let σ∗ be a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of G and let p ∈ (0, 1) denote the
probability that σ∗1 puts on U. We distinguish 3 cases.
2.1 v2(D, σ
∗
2)− v2(U, σ∗2) > v2(D, sj)− v2(U, sj).
For ε ∈ (0, p), let σ′1 be the strategy where player 1 plays U with probability p− ε/2.
Since any completely mixed strategy of player 1 is a profitable deviation from (U, sj),
it holds that (σ′1, s
j) ∈ f(U, sj). We have that
v2(σ
′
1, s
j) = v2(σ
∗
1, s
j) + ε
2
(v2(D, s
j)− v2(U, sj))
< v2(σ
∗) + ε
2
(v2(D, σ
∗
2)− v2(U, σ∗2))
= v2(σ
′
1, σ
∗
2),
where the strict inequality uses that σ∗2 is a best response against σ
∗
1 and the assumption
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of Case 2.1. It follows that (σ′1, σ
∗
2) ∈ f(σ′1, sj). Since ε > 0 can be chosen arbitrarily
small, this shows that σ∗ ∈ f∞(σ).
2.2 v2(D, σ
∗
2)− v2(U, σ∗2) < v2(D, sj)− v2(U, sj).
For ε ∈ (0, 1−p), let σ′1 be the strategy where player 1 plays U with probability p+ε/2.
The proof now follows as in Case 2.1.
2.3 v2(D, σ
∗
2)− v2(U, σ∗2) = v2(D, sj)− v2(U, sj).
It holds that (D, sj) ∈ f(U, sj).
Let sh be a best response of player 2 against D and, for ε ∈ (0, 1), let σ′2 be the strategy
that puts weight (1− ε) on σ∗2 and weight ε on sh. We have that
v2(D, σ
∗
2) = v2(σ
∗) + pv2(D, σ∗2)− pv2(U, σ∗2)
≥ v2(σ∗1, sj) + pv2(D, sj)− pv2(U, sj)
= v2(D, s
j), (A.1)
where the inequality uses that σ∗ is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of G and
the assumption of Case 2.3. Since (D, sj) is not a Nash equilibrium of G, it holds
that v2(D, s
h) > v2(D, s
j). By (A.1) and the definition of σ′2, it now follows that
v2(D, σ
′
2) > v2(D, s
j), so (D, σ′2) ∈ f(D, sj). Since (D, sh) is not a Nash equilibrium of
G and sh is a best response against D, we have that v1(σ
∗
1, s
h) > v1(D, s
h). It follows
that
v1(σ
∗
1, σ
′
2) = (1− ε)v1(σ∗) + εv1(σ∗1, sh) > (1− ε)v1(D, σ∗2) + εv1(D, sh) = v1(D, σ′2),
so (σ∗1, σ
′
2) ∈ f(D, σ′2). Since ε > 0 can be chosen arbitrarily small, we have that
σ∗ ∈ f∞(σ), which concludes the proof.
2
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